


NIC Operational Assessment

#21J-1007

Oklahoma County Detention Center

May 2021



Prepared by Timothy Ryan and Rollin Cook

Technical Resource Providers

Assisted by Michael Jackson, NIC Advisor

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June 9, 2021

Greg Williams, Administrator
Oklahoma County Detention Center
201 N. Shartel Avenue
Oklahoma City, OK 73102
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Subject: Operational Assessment of the Oklahoma County Detention Center (re: NIC Technical Assistance Project #21J-1007)

Dear Mr. Williams:

Enclosed is the Final Report that Rollin Cook and I prepared as a result of our on-site visit May 18-20, 2021. It outlines our observations and recommendations. We hope that they will serve as information, guidance, and resource for you and your staff, as you work toward making the Oklahoma County Detention Center(OCDC), its operation and its facility, a model for other jail jurisdictions to emulate.

We would like to express our sincere appreciation to you and all the OCDC staff, as well as the Trust leadership for the cooperation and courtesy extended to us. We recognize that our visit requires modification to the routine, but all found time to meet our every need or request. Our special thanks to Director of Operations William Monday and Captains Tiffany Carter and AJ Milton, along with the other staff leaders, managers, supervisors, and line personnel who helped guide and respond to our visit and its needs. They were consummate professionals throughout the review and had any information request made readily available. Notably, they all exhibited integrity and dedication which are attributes essential for jail administrators, managers, and staff to move positively forward into the future.

We certainly wish you and the entire Oklahoma County Detention Center well in your and its future endeavors and commend you for voluntarily undergoing this NIC Operational Review.

Sincerely yours,

Timothy P. Ryan

Cc: Michael Jackson, NIC Advisor
Rollin Cook, Technical Resource Provider

Disclaimer

NIC Technical Assistance #21J-1007

This technical assistance activity was funded by the Jails Division of the National Institute of Corrections (NIC) under the federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). The Institute is a federal agency established to provide assistance to strengthen state and local correctional agencies by creating more effective, humane, safe, and just correctional services.


The resource persons who provided the on-site technical assistance did so through a cooperative agreement, at the request of the Oklahoma County Detention Center through the coordination of the National Institute of Corrections. The direct on-site assistance and the subsequent report is intended to assist the agency in addressing issues outlined in the original request and in efforts to enhance the effectiveness of the agency.

The contents of this document reflect the views of Mr. Timothy P. Ryan and Mr. Rollin Cook. Points of view or opinions expressed in the Technical Assistance Report are those of the authors and do not represent the official opinions or policies of the US Department of Justice. Upon delivery of the final Technical Assistance Report to the agency that requested the assistance, the report becomes the property of the agency. The National Institute of Corrections will not distribute the report to non-NIC entities or consider it an agency record of the federal FOIA, without the express written approval of the agency.


OKLAHOMA COUNTY DETENTION CENTER



Seal



Oklahoma's location within the U.S.



Location within the U.S. state of Oklahoma

Oklahoma State, County, and OCDC Perspective

In an effort to understand the demographics of the Oklahoma County Detention Center, it is of value to be aware of some historical perspective of the state, county, and agency. The below information has been gathered to assess this.

Officially, Oklahoma was "Indian Territory" and Independent from 1834 thru 1907. However, from 1890 it was considered "Oklahoma Territory" under U.S. Jurisdiction. On November 16, 1907, it became the 46th State to join the Union. The Capital is Oklahoma City which is the center of this report. The total area is 69,899 square miles and ranks 20th in area among the 50 states. The census in 2020 was 3,963,516 and ranked 28th. The median income is \$50,051 and that is ranked 44th. The "official languages" are English, Choctaw, and Cherokee. For much of the 20th century Oklahoma was known as the "Oil Capital of the World". In 2018 Oklahoma was described as "the world's prison capital" with 1,079 of every 100,000 residents incarcerated. This incarceration rate was described as the highest of any state, and by comparison, higher than the incarceration rate of any country in the world.

Oklahoma County is one of 77 counties in Oklahoma, is located near the center of Oklahoma and estimated to have 797,434 persons residing in 2019. Oklahoma County encompasses Oklahoma City which is the Capitol of Oklahoma and is the largest metropolitan area of the state. There are over 172,000 families living in the county with a density of 1,023 per square mile. The demographics of the county breakdown as follows: 64% White, 15.4% African American, 3.5% Native American, 3% Asian, 0.1% Pacific Islander, 8.1% other races and 5.3% mixed races. 15.1% of the population were Hispanic or Latino of any race. 84.4% speak English and 11.5% speak Spanish as their first language. The age spread has been identified as 25.60% under the age of 18, 10.9% from 18 to 24, 30% from 25 to 44, 21.4% from 45 to 64, 12.2% over the age of 65. The medium income per household was \$42,916 and per family \$54,721. About 11.7% of families and 15.3% of the population are below the poverty line. The population has grown at a rate of 11% since 2010. Oklahoma City is the 45th largest media market in the United States. The primary newspaper, *the Oklahoman*, has a circulation of 138,493 weekdays and 202,690 on Sunday. There are over 500 radio stations broadcasting in state.

The Oklahoma County Detention Center is located in central Oklahoma City just a couple of blocks from the Capitol and the Oklahoma Federal Building Bombing location. The detention center was built in 1991, is 13 stories tall with a basement, and encloses 484,158 square feet. The basement includes areas like the kitchen, laundry, and warehouse. The first floor has OCDC administration, investigations, quality control, and booking and release. Floors 2 through 11 are inmate housing units comprised of four (4) pods of 50 cells each containing a lower level and mezzanine level. Floors 12 and 13 have only a single level and are subdivided into smaller units comprising the medical clinic, specialty housing, mental health, juveniles, and pregnant inmates. All of these housing pods were design under the "indirect supervision model" comprising a control station located in each pod where inmates can be monitored from within (Note: Most jails now are being design under the "direct supervision model"). The TRPs (Technical Resource Persons from NIC) were advised that the jail processes between 80 and 100 arrestees per day or 4+ every hour from Oklahoma County and two other counties.

On July 1, 2020, the Jail was transferred from the Sheriff to the Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Trust. The Trust hired Mr. Greg Williams as the Administrator for the OCDC reporting to the Trust. The TRPs were advised that the operation had immediate critical issues including severe water leaks throughout the building, no hot water, no air conditioning, staffing shortages, and much more of concern like holes between the cells large enough for inmates to crawl thru. Further, the annual budget has remained unclear, the staffing plan is incomplete with numbers running from 350 to 560, a high attrition rate with over 300 leaving in the last 11 months, the hiring of many new personnel with limited training, and the removal by the previous Sheriff of critical operational information and equipment. All of this while facing the challenge of operation within the pandemic of Covid-19. (Note: Over the next couple of pages are the Mission, Vision, and Values of the OCDC and pictures of what the Trust and Mr. Williams was facing and showing the goals they hope to achieve.)

The above led Administrator Williams to seek the help from NIC which brought this team to the OCDC in May of 2021.

OKLAHOMA COUNTY DETENTION CENTER



Our Mission

To provide protection through efficient and effective services and intervention leading to less victimization, and more personal growth and development.

Our Vision

Operate a secure, safe, efficient, and humane facility for employees and arrestees that promotes teamwork, harmony, honesty, integrity, commitment to progressiveness, sobriety, and respect.

Promote efficiency while maintaining a safe environment for citizens, employees, and arrestees by responsibly managing the resources and the trust given to us by the citizens and elected officials of Oklahoma County, never forgetting that the safety of Oklahoma County is our top priority; and

Work with our community, volunteers, and partner agencies to provide effective and professional public safety services for all who have been placed into our custody.

Our Values

We value the system of laws that govern us, including the Constitutions of the United States and the State of Oklahoma.

We value the communities we serve. Our purpose is to serve our communities, keep them safe, and work with them to solve challenges.

We value all persons, respecting the diversity among individuals.

We treat everyone with courtesy, respect and dignity.

We value excellence.

We value an environment where individuals thrive and teams excel by pursuing the mission and vision.

We value personal character with a continuous commitment to teamwork, harmony, honesty and integrity,

We value open and effective communicators who display adaptability and sound judgement.

We value employees who are well-trained professionals, demonstrating the highest standards of excellence.

Repairs in Progress



Maintenance Goals




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Preface

This National Institute of Corrections (NIC) Technical Assistance Project (TAP) #21J-1007 is not the first to have been conducted of the Oklahoma County Detention Center (OCDC). In fact, there was another from January 30 – February 2, 2004, under #04-J1075. It was based upon a request from Sheriff John Whetsel in which contractor Warren Cook was to provide technical services in the form of an in-depth analysis of the jail's use of force and the process within the Jail Intake Unit. This Report involved fifteen (15) general recommendations with some including several sub-categories. (Note: This has several recommendations that will be identified in our Report and still need to be addressed including staffing, quality control, exterior security, accreditation efforts, signage, intake processing, etc. **It is recommended that a supervisory level staff member be given this for an update/action plan report in 30 days. A copy of this Report has been placed in the Report we prepared for Administrator Williams.**)

In 2007 the federal Department of Justice initiated an inquiry into alleged human and civil rights violations at the OCDC. Their Report distributed in 2008 outlined issues with overcrowding (2,400 inmates in a facility designed for 1200), staffing, and inmate supervision. Pursuant to information received from the OCDC it is still under DOJ review. **It is recommended that OCDC General, Trust, and County Counsel meet to assess this action and determine where the OCDC may stand in this matter.**

In December of 2009, the latest Oklahoma County "Adult Detention Center Master Plan" was completed by Frankfurt-Short-Bruze Associates, P.C./HOK/PBA. In so preparing the facility was identified as having an Occupant Capacity of 1,200, Rated Capacity of 2,890, but a real Occupancy Capacity of 2,212. On the days we toured the inmate count was 1500. Nationally, a jail is considered overcrowded when it reaches 90% of rated capacity. **However, as TRPs we recommend that a true new and updated "rated capacity" be determined so that staff and the Trust can have a definitive point of understanding of where the next step in design and construction may be needed.**

This 2009 Report identified 18 areas of Observations and Findings leading to fourteen (14) Recommendations for the Exterior of the Building and sixteen (16) Recommendation for the Interior of the Building. Clearly, some of these were significant safety and security measures like door locks that could be opened by inmates. **It is recommended that the Director of Facilities be directed to review this Report and return with an update/action plan within sixty (60) days. (Note: This material was also placed in the Administrator's Report.)**

Between 2009 and July of 2020 it was reported to the TRPs that there has been a decade of building deterioration including major leaks, lack of hot water, no air conditioning, and holes being created by inmates between cells large enough to allow an inmate to move from one cell to the next. At the same time inmate health care has been extremely troublesome with it identified that forty-five (45) inmates have died in custody between 2014-2019. Since January of 2021 six (6) inmates have died. Of course, some of these were natural, but one was due to a hostage situation. However, these numbers are disturbing.

Due to the above, the County of Oklahoma chose to remove the jail from the Sheriff on June 10, 2019, with the creation of the “Trust Indenture – Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority”, commonly called the “Jail Trust” (See Appendix III). It became effective July 1, 2020, giving certain “Powers and Duties to the Trustees”, specifically relative to the OCDC, under Article IV, Sections 37, 38, and 39 (See Appendix IV).

Of particular note, Section 37 directs the Sheriff to “...provide reasonable access to the Jail Facilities and to the financial, operational, and procedural records relating thereto...” It was reported to the TRPs that this did not “reasonably occur” leaving the Trust and the Administration in an extremely difficult position at the time of take-over. For example, personnel records were removed of staff remaining at the jail along with all movable equipment for running the operation. Such actions seriously jeopardized and continues to be troublesome to the OCDC leadership and staff in meeting the Trust’s responsibilities as outlined in Section 38.

With the recognition that over \$13.0 million has been spent in completing necessary repairs to water leakage, air conditioning, and hot water, **the TRPs recommend that an Annual Report be directed by the Trust regarding the status of Sections 38 sub-sections (i) – (vii) and Section 39.** This is believed to help ensure transparency of the operation and the status of meeting of the Goals of the Trust.

In addressing the above it is fully understood that given the multitude of the issues facing the OCDC that these recommendations and the ones in this Report will be most challenging indeed. However, all the staff we met and interviewed believed in the new administration and wanted to be part of the changes and improvements. **As such, we recommend that all be engaged to the maximum extent possible.**

Introduction

Over the period Tuesday, May 18, through Thursday, May 20, 2021, Timothy Ryan (Retired, Director of the Miami-Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department), Rollin Collin (Past Director of the Utah and Commissioner of the Connecticut State Departments of Correction), and Michael Jackson (Technical Advisor from the National Institute of Corrections, Jails Division of the Bureau of Prisons) were Technical Resource Providers (TRPs) for an on-site Operational Assessment of the Oklahoma County Detention Center (OCDC) located in the City of Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. Our services were conducted under the auspices of the Jails Division pursuant to a Technical Assistance Request from Greg Williams, Administrator of the OCDC.

Under a Request for Quote process (RFQ), a contract for services was issued on April 9, 2021. Upon that it was designated that Mr. Mike Jackson, a NIC Correctional Program Specialist (CPS) from the Jails Division, was identified as the contract contact. As was determined later he became part of the TAP partners that were to conduct the Operational Assessment for the OCDC Project #21J-1007.

Pursuant to this, the following report represents the observations, findings, conclusions, and recommendations of Tim Ryan, Rollin Cook, and Mike Jackson over the period May 18-20, 2021. These determinations were the results of their review of documents, facility inspections, and interviews with the leadership team, general staff, and inmates of the OCDC. Their recommendations, although recognized to have been developed over only a three-day review, reflect their extensive knowledge and experience in managing and consulting for major jail systems, involvement in national professional organizations including the American Jail Association, American Correctional Association, as well active participation in other assessments, audits, and expert witness services under the NIC, Commission on Accreditation for Corrections, and consulting services.

Mr. Cook's and Mr. Ryan's, along with NIC Advisor Mr. Mike Jackson's, previous experience includes, but is not limited to, reviews of other domestic United States jail and prison sites and many years of line, supervisory, managerial, administrative services, and training in American jails.

Mr. Cook's past includes the Commissioner of the Connecticut Department of Correction and the Director of the Utah Department of Corrections (Appointed by the Governor's). He further served as a member of the Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office rising in rank from Deputy to Chief Deputy starting in 1989 to 2012 (Total 33 years). His services have included as a trainer for NIC, the American Jail Association, the American Correctional Association (ACA), and the Utah Sheriff's Association. His education includes an MBA from the University of Phoenix and a BA from Columbia College in Salt Lake City, Utah.

Mr. Ryan's past includes as the jail administrator in four (4) of the top twenty (20) largest jails in America (44 years). Two were in California and two in Florida. He was the Past President of the American Jail Association (AJA) and Commissioner for the ACA Commission on Accreditation for Corrections. He is a Life Member of AJA, one the first Certified Jail Managers (CJMs) for the AJA (1997), and like, Mr. Cook, has served as a TRP for NIC on numerous

operational assessments on both big and small jails. He has an MPA from the California State University in Hayward, California and BS in Business from the University of California, Berkeley.

NIC Advisor Mr. Mike Jackson's past includes fourteen (14) years of service with NIC as a Correctional Program Specialist (CPS). Prior to that he served in the Fairfax County Sheriff's Office, Virginia in the Correctional Services Division for twenty-six (26) years rising to the rank of Division Commander before retirement. During this period he has conducted numerous jail operational assessments, trainings for NIC, AJA, and ACA, as well as preparing curriculum for the Large Jail Network which will be discussed later in the report.

However, even with all of these credentials, it is important to acknowledge that such a short visit (just three days) develops only impressions and perceptions requiring further in-depth assessments by site staff as part of their consideration of this Report. Given this though, we are committed to providing our most comprehensive and professional advice and recommendations to the Oklahoma County Detention Center, its leadership, and staff possible.

Observations and Recommendations

Upon completion of our briefings and throughout our tours and interviews, we were impressed by the commitment of the staff to achieving professionalism in the jail business, as well as desiring to work together to achieve the same. At the same time, as assessors/consultants in this matter, we were committed to conducting a critical review of what we observed. In doing so we were given an open and “free range” of the jail to assess any area that we determined needed our attention. This is a credit to Administrator Williams and the entire staff.

Relative to our Report, it is outlined as follows:

- Life Safety and Security;
- Intake and Release;
- Housing Units;
- Policy and Procedures;
- Staff Training;
- Conditions of Confinement;
- Sanitation;
- Security;
- Inmate Management; and
- Agency Culture.

The items, issues, and concerns are not necessarily in a priority which is up to the agency to address as may be deemed appropriate.

Life Safety and Security:

This area of the Report is deemed by the TRPs as significant and to be given special attention. This includes:

1. On some housing floors inmates were using fire to heat water for coffee and noodles. Although the TRPs did not actually observe a fire, the smoke remnants were clearly evident and the cans for said burning were on the walls. Of certain surprise to us was that both inmates and staff seemed have accepted this as “approved”, even though in an enclosed jail environment it is a serious danger.

Recommendation: We have been told that hot water is now available in the building so that sufficient heat for the inmate needs “should be” readily available. All such burn cans should be immediately removed. (Note: If for some reason the level of heat of the water is insufficient, then it is recommended that the Keefe Commissary Company be requested to provide microwaves for each housing unit.)

Aside: The TRPs also could not understand why smoke detectors in the building were not functioning, giving the impression that they might be dis-functional or somehow turn off.

2. Even though the TRPs had not seen telephones actually being located in inmate cells, the concept has merit if they are operational, especially in an emergency. For example, the phones on the 13th floor, Pregnant Inmate Unit, the TRPs asked the inmates to conduct a system test explaining that it was the middle of the night and their cellmate had gone into labor. She attempted two numbers that she had been told to use to no avail and then was advised of third. Apparently, the third went to Central Control but was unanswered. The inmates said they would then have to bang on the doors to get help. Unfortunately, we discovered that most of the staff did not know the emergency number and had not ever tested it in their housing units.

Recommendation: The Global Tel*Link Corporation has a contract with the OCDC thru 2023 which seems to call for repair services within 1-6 hours or face a \$1,000 a day penalty up to \$35,000 annually. This contract covers all the housing floors. The TRPs could not understand why said corrections had not been made and signs placed over every phone identifying emergency contact numbers that function.

3. On the days of the TRPs visit, 1500 inmates were in custody. In both male and female areas it was found that inmates were being house three (3) to a cell due to holes between cells on some floors (which will be discussed later). The third person was sleeping on a mattress on the floor (Note: See pregnancy unit information above). The inmates, so having to sleep, identified this as a pest control issue advising of bites from "bed bugs" on arms and legs.

Recommendation: Most jails use a plastic boat in which the mattresses are placed for inmates to sleep. It is certainly not perfect but should help if sanitized each day. The TRPs found stacks of these boats, unused in different location in the jail. Until vacant cells can be occupied, inmates should be required to use these for health and safety purposes.

4. Although normally extremely unlikely, but given the recent hostage situation, the use of firearms to secure the facility seems to be a necessary consideration. However, we were told that the Sheriff removed all the firearms from the Armory. This seems unsafe in today's weapons use environment.

Recommendation: Since we are certainly not in a position to dictate said policy, we do believe it is worthy of consideration to re-arm for the future. This is certainly because we were made aware that many of the staff are firearms qualified and could be used in emergencies. If approved, it should include quarterly training in mock events.

5. It was clear and convincing that the present level of staffing was insufficient for a safe and secure jail. The TRPs were advised that over 300 staff had left in the last 10 months which was a tremendously high attrition rate. At the same time, the OCDC has had to seemingly reduce requirements and/or cut corners to seek applicants and hires. This has included "same day applicant" hiring without thorough backgrounds of any sort. It now

offers only a two-week Academy and no JTO (Jail Training Officer) Program. The OCDC Administration has created of incentive programs to entice applicants. However, the operational staff have expressed concern that these new personnel lack the basic skills to be a detention officer.

Recommendation: From the TRPs perspective there may be several other options to explore including:

- a. **The housing Control Booths are occupied by Detention Officers. Many jails have reclassified this position to a civilian slot entitled “Correctional Technician” or similar (such as Miami-Dade County). This allows for Detention Officers to be moved to inmate contact position for which they were hired allowing direct safety and security in the housing units and reducing the cost of the control booth (Note: This includes the Central Control areas as well).**

Under the “Correctional Technician Concept”, it allows the hiring of veterans just leaving the service (at any age), more female staff since there would be no inmate contact, and the physically compromised (ADA) who may only be able to monitor inmates via video. Through these hirings the experience has been a much lower attrition rate, plus a much closer observation of the inmates.

- b. **The OCDC inmate classification process is not inclusive of the latest Objective Classification Systems technology and the personnel seemingly need updated policy, procedures, and training. Many jails have also moved these assignments from detention officers to civilian positions in an effort to support consistency in operations, as well as move detention officers to inmate direct contact positions. These positions are extremely important to the proper housing of inmates and the safety of officers and inmates. The positions have required a college graduation requirement and requisite salaries (Check with the Broward County Sheriff’s Office). The skill of these personnel has been identified as excellent and the attrition rate small. As part of this it was recognized that there are several colleges and universities in the area that might be engaged to seek applicants.**
- c. **The TRPs were unclear as to how closely the HR Department was working with the local high schools and colleges to include programs in corrections and general criminal justice. There are many models for this throughout the nation. Obviously, this is an area of focus if it has not been tapped.**

6. While touring the TRPs were advised that during the search of an Orderly’s (Trustee/Inmate Worker) closet, 5 cell phones and marijuana were discovered. This leads to many questions as to the security of the facility. Who brought these in – inmates or

staff? How did they get to the Orderly's closet given inmate searches? How long had they been there without discovery? What else may be secreted in the facility – weapons?

Recommendation: Although managers, supervisors, and line staff need to be engaged in looking at answers to this for their own safety and security, there is an I/A and Investigation Unit on the first floor. It is recommended that they become fully engaged in identifying how this may be occurring and who, if any staff, may be involved. Also, as part of this, it may be of value to seek the assistance of other jail personnel, like Tulsa, to assess this concern and see if they have suggestions.

Intake and Release (See Appendix II for additional information):

1. This area is clearly too small for the activity of 80-100 arrestees per day (4+ per hour). It gives the appearance of disarray, clutter, lack of sanitation, and processing flow issues. There remains water leaking from the ceiling leaving tiles hanging. Due to intake crowding in this area, it seems that OCDC needs to consider some processing options to reduce potential problems in the booking area.

Recommendation: Although it may seem somewhat unorthodox for OCDC, many jails have gone to an open booking and release concept. This would require a special screening process at Intake to determine arrestees that “might be eligible” for quick release. It was indicated that it might even require a change in some laws. However, if an arrestee could be determined to be a released eligible inmate, then he/she could be separated from the other inmates for special processing in an effort to reduce the crowding in the booking area.

For example, there appeared to be a large room on the first floor that might be re-organized to include chairs with handcuffs and phones for these inmates to use in an effort to get released.

2. The front end of the intake process in most jails now require the arrestee to be quickly examined by medical staff prior to admission. The objective is to prevent arrestees that are too ill or injured for incarceration to be taken to a hospital by the arresting/transporting officer prior to crossing the jail threshold. The OCDC functions in just the opposite manner with medical assessment coming second. Further, the arresting/transporting officers are not allowed to enter the facility which did not seem to be restricted during our visit. This seemingly adds to confusion. And finally, arresting/transporting officers need to be required to provide the jail staff with information, via a form, as to any medical or mental health concerns that were identified as part of the arrest, for example use of a tazer or baton.

Recommendation: Assess the ability to change the intake medical screening to the front end of the intake process. Further, if this LEO informational form to the jail is not presently in use, it needs to be discussed with the local Chiefs of Police and implemented.

3. Information was presented to the TRPs that the District Attorney has 10 days to file a criminal complaint while the inmate remains in custody. This literally means that new arrestees can be housed, even on minor allegations, for an extended period when the end result is going to be “no complaint.” Of course, we are not familiar with Oklahoma Law, but this seems like an extended period of incarceration that needs closer review. Most jails of which we are familiar require the first appearance and complaint within 24-48 hours. If there is no complaint at that time, the inmate is released but is subject to re-file later per the DA’s review.

Recommendation: It seems it would be of value to have the jail’s, and the county’s attorneys assess this and see what options may be available through process or legislation. There is certainly risk in such options, but so is overcrowding the jail.

4. As noted above, the TRPs found serious concerns with the Intake Arrestee/Inmate Classification Process. Basically, it was determined that the present process is one that might have served jails many years ago but has been invalidated by court decisions since. Therefore, today, the jail process calls for the “Objective Classification System” housed in several identified technological programs. Given the diversity of arrestees from sexual orientation to ADA issues to PREA concerns to charges and institutional history, the use of the concept of simply identifying inmates as minimum, medium, and maximum is a danger to operations in general, has foreseeable litigation, and is a danger to inmate and staff safety.

Recommendation: NIC is an excellent resource with materials and programs to help the OCDC address this operational deficiency. The captain of this area is an excellent person to assess this for the future and to take appropriate steps to implement as soon as possible. Administrator Williams and Director of Operations Monday were provided with copies of NIC’s *Objective Jail Classification for Jail Administrators* publication and offered assistance from NIC for implementation.

Aside: It was noted that the OCDC was in the process of creating a Policy Statement regarding Classification (4105.05, dated May 4, 2021), but was not yet in practice.

5. The release area is immediately adjacent to the first steps in the intake process through an open door. The door being opened left the possibility of a knowledgeable arrestee to know how to seek escape from the facility. This was particularly troubling when the TRPs discovered two pair of scissors lying in the open that might be available for the taking of a hostage.

Recommendation: The access door should only be open when accepting releasees and no other inmates are nearby and always closed when releasees have entered (Note: It is believed that few if any incidence occur with inmates that are in the release process.) Instruments that could be of danger to staff should always remain hidden and secured, like scissors on a short chain under the counter.

Aside: There also were unidentified materials of released inmate items that were cluttering the area in a couple of cabinets. Some appeared to have been there for an extended period. The staff had been told to leave it. However, it should be moved and/or destroyed.

Housing Units (See additional information in Appendix II):

1. All of the housing units we visited were in poor condition to include, but not limited to cracked windows, cell and wall graffiti, disabled phones, and broken table, chairs, and kiosks. Water leaks could be seen as having been in the units in multiple locations with stains everywhere. This has apparently caused ceilings to be corrupted, hanging down, and stained. The shower areas were without lighting, unsanitary with drains clogged and holding standing water, and lacking proper hanging curtains for women and men. However, the most disturbing were the holes made in the cell walls large enough to allow inmates to move without restriction from cell to cell in a line inside pods (Note: For one important item this shows the failure of the jail's architectural design of indirect supervision of inmates, as well as poor construction.)

Recommendation: One of the Principles of Direct Supervision is "Ownership". This means that staffing assignments in each housing unit remain as consistent as possible and holding the staff member accountable for problems like unit damages. The expectation is that the designated staff member takes pride in their housing unit. It is clearly understood that staffing in the jail must be sufficient to provide constant oversight by detention officers in each pod by implementing one of the recommendations above, like civilian staff in the control booths.

However, in the meantime, it seems to the TRPs that some inmate utilization to correct the damages to the existing housing may be appropriate. Most jails can identify in the sentenced population a number of construction workers, masons, electricians, painters, plumbers, etc. Although challenging, these inmates should be put to work taking corrective measures to the maximum extent possible.

For example:

- a. Painters should be used to clean and paint vacant unit walls eliminating stains and graffiti;
- b. Painters should also be given the duty to paint metal bunks and doors;
- c. Plumbers should be used to clean the showers and drains;
- d. Masons and construction workers should be used to fill in the holes in the cell walls using barriers made out of plywood to corral the cement until hardened;
- e. Cable TV employees should be used to reset TVs so they can be seen by the inmates.

If county funding is difficult, the profit from the Inmate Commissary funds might be used. For supervision of the inmates if maintenance staff is unavailable, knowledgeable detention officers on overtime could be used. Also, given that there

might be deputy sheriffs who previously worked in the jail, they might be used for supervision.

Overall, it just seems critical to the TRPs that triple bunking needs to be corrected immediately and vacant housing units be cleaned up and prepared for occupancy. This might be done at minimum expense while showing the community that OCDC is using the inmates, who created some of the problems, to correct them.

2. The Pod Control Booths seemed to be in disarray as well. They were not clean for staff and there were many items that did not appear to belong there like old used equipment, documents, etc. The OCDC Policies, Procedures, and Post Orders were nowhere to be found.

Recommendation: It is believed that the overnight shift managers should be directed to conduct an inventory of the materials and operational necessities that are required for each pod control booth. Any items that do not fit the proper inventory are to be removed including out of date or erroneous materials taped to the windows and walls. Each and every electronic device necessary for the smooth operation of the pod is to be specifically checked for proper functioning. It is believed that each pod control booth should be given the old Post Order, via the Quality Control Unit, even if not fully updated to the new Administration's Standards. The evening shift captains should immediately correct this situation while using this as an opportunity to have detention offices trained in the pod responsibilities, especially in critical situations. Once these pod controls are cleaned and properly supplied, a quarterly inspection process needs to be initiated with a report of the status to the OCDC leadership.

3. Obviously, once a cell has been cleaned and repaired for new occupancy, there needs to be a process in place to keep it that way. As such, many jails have the new, incoming inmate, sign a notice of his/her responsibility for cleanliness and financial accountability for damages when they leave. It also should use criminal charges for severe damages. However, this does not work without staff accountability as well.

Recommendation: Conduct an exploration of how other jails maintain cell and pod cleanliness and sanitation.

4. In the short period of the TRPs visit, several types of cells necessary might have been missed, but need consideration. This is not to say they were not in the facility it simple means attention may be necessary. We did see a negative pressure cell for the use of TB inmates nor the padded cell for the severely mentally ill and danger to self and others inmate cell. There is the need for a hearing impaired (ADA) cell to include a flashing light to announce a fire alarm and TDY access along with staff training on how to monitor said inmates. A juvenile housing cell was observed with a juvenile in cell. This cell was filthy with the toilet and sink backed up with water and a telephone with intermittent phone access and usage availability, per the inmate. Per appropriate legal

requirements, juveniles are not to be in an area that is near "sight and sound of adult inmates." This 13th floor cell did not fit that requirement.

Recommendation: First, an inventory of these types of cells needs to be determined and, if not in place, steps taken to correct the situation. Second, if the juvenile cannot be housed in another location, his cell needs to be thoroughly cleaned and measures taken to attempt to meet the "sight and sound" requirement.

5. As noted in items Housing Unit #1 and #2 above, Staff Pride in their assigned duties needs to be fostered. We do not mean that that the staff did not have it but does mean they may have need of leadership in what facility "Ownership" truly means that the captains exhibited. For example, one detention officer and nursing staff member, who had been in their assignments on the 13th floor for over a year, were asked what was in the locked cupboard directly above the officer's desk. Neither knew and it took several hours for them to determine that a maintenance staff member, out in the Maintenance Yard, was the only one who had a key to this cupboard which contained lice spraying supplies. Also, on the 13th floor, the Medical Unit, there was a cell identified as the "Dead Cell" which was also listed on a wall chart in the nurse's station. Upon questioning it was determined that this meant that the cell was unusable and not housing a dead inmate.

Recommendation: For the TRPs this seemed to indicate a need for the administration and managerial staff to fully engage line staff in what surrounds their duties. Since most of the plant facility issues have been addressed, it is now time for the administrative leadership team to have personal meetings on all shifts with staff regarding Goals and Objectives over the next year, as well as expectations of detention officer while on duty relative to everything that surrounds their assignments. The TRPs consider Corrections a "Profession and not just a Job" which needs to be conveyed to new and old personnel.

Policy and Procedures (Also see notes in Appendix II):

1. During the first two days of the TRPs visit, we were bombarded with the need to have Policies, Procedures, and Post Orders available throughout the facility. As noted above we could not find any. It was indicated that the Sheriff had removed all these during the transition and the present staff was left in limbo. If true, it was strongly suggested that the Sheriff's P&Ps be re-instated until the new administration could provide new ones. However, on day three, it was determined that in the Quality Control Unit on the first floor had many of these P&Ps and they were readily available. When questioned, the QC staff said that "nobody had asked for them? This type of miscommunication was evident in much of the facility's operations and was disturbing to the TRPs.

Recommendation: As part of the Housing Control Booth actions listed above, there needs to be the inclusion of the QC staff to provide P&Ps and Post Orders as may be required. Since the final "new" ones need the approval of the OCDC Counsel before formal implementation and it is quite clear that she is over-whelmed with

other issues, some assistance should be considered. Possibly, the previous County Counsel member for the jail could assist on a part-time basis. Could a process be set up where a captain has a “P” a week and be directed to read and update? That would clear up 16 a month. Obviously, QC needs to provide information on what has been approved and what, if any, needs to be completed and signed off.

2. While searching for P&P, the TRPs discussed the same with the contractor staff for True Key Health Clinic and Summit food Services. In the Clinic no manual was available and only some operational protocols were available. It was apparently expected that nursing staff knew what to do in a correctional environment upon hiring? Relative to food services a tattered manual was identified as the guide.

Relative to these contractual obligations, there was definite disconnect determined relative to Therapeutic Meals expected to be found in a jail environment. The Summit Manual included eleven different possible Therapeutic (including allergy related) meals but did not include peanuts or shellfish. The Clinic only included four and one was an allergy to “beans” which neither the Director of Nursing nor Summit Kitchen Manager had ever heard. However, the kitchen manager said the “Bean Allergy” was numerically the most “therapeutic meals” prepared and distributed to inmates of which they had to deal. (Note: It is believed that many regular meals for the inmates included beans, and the inmates convinced medical staff that they have an allergy to get a different meal than general inmates.) The kitchen staff have been directed to do “what medical says.”

Recommendation: Obviously, both contractors need 2021 Manuals with copies provided to the Administration and QC. At the same time, they must meet regularly to synchronize their operations to one another. Further, only nationally recognized allergies should comprise the operation.

Aside: On the third day, since the True Key Health Clinic did not have a manual, QC was asked if they did. Amazingly, they did, and it was said that the Clinic would get one if they had asked? The Manual was given to the medical representative at the Out Briefing on Thursday to address with QC.

Staff Training (See Appendix II for more details):

1. The first steps in training are recruiting and hiring qualified staff members. This includes finding persons who have a desire to join and stay. Whether having a high school diploma, a complete or partial college degree, or a release from military services, the recruiting process is critical in hiring the best qualified. The administration has put in place several incentives for hiring that have promise for hiring these qualified personnel. However, the lack of proper staffing levels has led to quick hiring without proper background checks of unqualified people, including gang members. It is demoralizing to existing staff to see new hires removed because they did not meet minimum standards.

Although challenging due to the need for staff at the earliest possible time, the failure to have staff meeting the minimum standards at hiring appears to be even more deleterious

to overall operations. The background investigation unit seems to do less than the minimum in assessing of new applicants. For example, they do not even have a credit check process which is an easy application.

Recommendation: Even though the TRPs saw the need for more staff, especially detention officers, there seemed to have been no communication of issues and concerns between the background unit and the Director of HR during her time in the position. This is difficult to understand, if true, but it is clear that more connection is critically needed. The OCDC certainly does not need to continue the serious attrition rate it is experiencing and hiring the “right people” for the corrections profession is absolutely necessary.

2. The OCDC has a two-week Academy that covers a multitude of subjects (See Appendix Attachment V). This is done in eight (8) 10-hour days, Monday thru Thursday, every couple of weeks. Some classes run less than 5 recruits while others a little more. The TRPs did not have time to review the actual curriculum for each class but were concerned its detail was insufficient to train qualified Detention Officers. Obviously, we do not know Oklahoma law regarding such training requirements but believe that a more in-depth program is truly needed. For example, the Miami Dade Corrections and Rehabilitation Department has a six-month Academy 25-30 recruits. There is a testing process every two weeks and those that fail two tests are weeded out before assuming any position. Following successful graduation there is a 6-week Jail Training Program (JTO). It has been granted a separate and distinct budget from the County.

Recommendation: The TRPs fully recognize the OCDC situation may be seen as different from other jails, but its attrition rate tells a different story. The complete and intensive training of detention officers is a critical component of a jail’s operation. Absent new recruits understanding risks and responsibilities from the outset, along professional expectations, leads to a lack of commitment, complacency, and attrition. A longer and more in-depth Academy seems like an opportunity to address this.

Aside: The jail CFO advised that there will be funds left over from the budget this year. It needs to be carried over, as excess, to the 21-22 FY budget to increase the length of the Academy. Further, if there is a significant amount of funding left over in the Personnel Budget due to the high attrition rate, inability to hire and numerous vacancies, the OCDC should explore the feasibility of hiring, on overtime, if necessary, sheriff’s deputies/sergeants, who have worked in the jail to help secure the operation until vacant positions can be filled, but under the direct monitoring of the new administration. This is a model used in other jails, like Santa Clara County, San Jose, California. It is certainly, not optimum, but the under staffing today is seen as a significant safety and security concern.

3. There was an extensive discussion with the Director of Training and subordinate staff (See Appendix Attachment II – Staff Training). Several items surfaced that need attention including lack of space for training, need for leadership training, curriculum

being outdated and needing updates, especially for “in-service”, shortness of the Academy and Annual Training, lack of a JTO Program, and several other items.

Recommendation: Given the above information, there needs to be a multi-level agency team to assess the training program required for the future success of the jail. Such teams are in most jails and the TRPs see this as a viable means to incorporate what the general staff see as issues and what the Training Unit can provide.

Conditions of Confinement (See also Appendix Attachment II):

1. There has already been much mentioned about this in the report. However, since there are potential civil consequences for the County of Oklahoma that are still continuing with the federal DOJ, it seems important to re-emphasize some of our observations. Some need a financial commitment to correct, but others need administration and staff commitment too address. For example, in 2019 there were 6,630 work orders issued. Of these 2,318 were completed leaving 4,312 unfinished. There was no such information available to the TRPs for 2020 and so far in 2021. However, the implication is clear that the Maintenance Staff needs help to correct these “Conditions of Confinement.”

These “conditions” included, but were not limited to:

- Insufficient air exchange (See ACA Accreditation Standard 4-ALDF-1A-19);
- Smoke detector failures;
- Broken windows everywhere and equipment;
- Damaged ceilings;
- Large holes broken out by inmates between cells;
- Lack of pest control (bed bugs, roaches, and mice);
- Triple bunking with inmates laying on floor mattresses;
- Shower drains plugged without lighting or curtains;
- Dirty floors, hallways, and elevators;
- Inmate meals on carts left outside units possibly dropping below proper temperature levels before serving;
- Dirty cells with unclean sinks and toilets along with walls covered with graffiti;
- Apparent uncleaned mattresses from one inmate to the next;
- Insufficient time out of cells even for minimum inmates;
- Lack of access to the recreation yards both inside and on top of the building.

Recommendation: The TRPs fully recognize the overall challenge the new Administration has been facing, along with the Trust. However, it is now time to turn the major facility issues like water leakage over to the Director of Facilities and focus Administration on the internal operational needs. The OCDC needs to prepare an Action Plan and Timeline for correcting the above and other issues. This will go far to mitigate the adverse consequences of Civil Action by the DOJ.

Sanitation (Also see Appendix Attachment II):

1. Overall, the sanitation of the facility was very disturbing. Given the unclean nature of the facility in general, the TRPs wondered what services the Orderlies (Trustees/Inmates) actually performed. On one floor these inmates were discovered in a recreation area playing chess. Given the number of dirty areas found in the facility and 1500 inmates many of which should be eligible to work, the TRPs thought that the internal work program needed some immediate attention.

Inmate workers (Orderlies in OCDC) are utilized in all jails. They are certainly not perfect, absent supervision there will be no substantive work (cleanliness achieved). Is there some sort of training program for these inmates? Are they aware of the consequences of a failure perform adequate services (return to cell)? Are they given time off their sentence for productive services?

Recommendation: Along with what has been identified in the report, this inmate program needs some special attention.

Security (Also see Appendix Attachment):

1. Security is the precautions that must be taken by a jail to ensure the safety of staff and inmates, and prevent crime, escape, hostages, contraband, and much more. One of the most important is to know who was in the building and their location, if feasible, at all times. However, the TRPs found this lacking. There was no real checkpoint for staff, contractors, and volunteers entering the jail. Persons were entering the jail with back packs unchecked. People, like ourselves, were not required to wear identification or display something accordingly. We observed a person, later identified as a contractor, in street clothes, without identification, standing to take an elevator. No one questioned him or stopped him?

Recommendation: Immediately institute an identification badge system so that every person in the facility can be identified. Create a color system that prohibits certain badged persons from being in unauthorized areas. Do not allow any person to enter the lobby absent a security check of their bags, briefcases, purses, etc.

Aside: The OCDC just hired a Safety Coordinator. This seems like a perfect first job for him as part of his initiation into the jail environment.

2. The TRPs observed the back gate to the Maintenance Yard open during our tour. There were Orderlies working in the area with limited supervision. Although it has been our experience that said inmate types are unlikely to escape, the leaving of such an opportunity should not have occurred. The captain said she would correct the situation, closed the gate, and indicated she would address the problem with the appropriate persons. There are hundreds of security doors in a jail and the proper handling of them is every one's responsibility.

Recommendation: This is a weekly staff briefing matter that needs to be addressed by supervisors.

Inmate Management (See also Appendix Attachment II): Basically, the TRPs found no true inmate management. The “indirect inmate supervision model” over which the facility was designed simply does not work in today’s jails. The single Detention Officer assigned to a Pod Control Booth who makes only hourly rounds of looking into cells with no such coverage at all at night was beyond comprehension for the TRPs. Too much is adversely occurring in this environment that is not being, in any way, controlled by staff. The national standards from ACA now require inmates be observed every 40 minutes and other inmates as little as every 15 minutes. Given that we found that the Emergency Phone System does not function, and inmates are left alone overnight, inmate safety and jail security is in constant jeopardy.

Recommendation: The OCDC needs to move to a direct supervision model as quickly as possible with training for line staff, supervisors, and managers. In the meantime, there needs to be every effort made to have constantly moving teams of, at least, two detention officers entering pods and observing inmates in and out of cells day and especially at night.

Aside: NIC may be in a position to assist with this type of training. Please check with Mr. Jackson.

Agency Culture: This area jumped out for the TRPs as needing immediate attention. There seemed to be a distinct divide between OCDC leadership and OCDC staff. In so identifying this, we did not mean that anyone is not doing their jobs. However, there was a seeming disconnect between all the areas and people we interviewed. As noted above, True Key Health Clinic had not talked to Summit Food Services about the Therapeutic Meal Plans or has ever had a meeting. The Director of HR and the Background Staff have never had a meeting. The QC staff have never talked to the captains regarding their need for P&Ps and vice versa. The Program Manager has never talked to the previous Sergeant of Program Services regarding the programs and has been waiting for direction for 10 months. The Director of Training has not contacted jail managers to determine what the jail training needs are. This list goes on to encompass the OCDC Administrator and Chief of Operations seemingly not taken the time to engage in shift meetings with the jail staff about everything that may be going on in the jail.

Recommendation: This is an area in which Administrator Williams needs to give serious personal attention and direction as he moves forward with the agency. He must let what appears to be a prison- oriented leadership team come to understand the uniqueness of a jail environment and the importance of internal communications 24/7. Initially, he now has a great opportunity, with the easing of the mechanical failures in the building, to take on initiating meetings between all the persons and sub-agency staff in the OCDC. He needs to get these discussions flowing and it is believed that much of the staff frustration will quickly diminish.

This concludes this area of the Report.

General Thoughts and Considerations

The following is information developed as part of the TRPs tour that seem worthy of being passed to the OCDC. They are not in any particular order:

1. The Law Librarian, Ms. Carrion, advised that her job is to provide legal materials to the three (3) pro se' inmates at OCDC. When asked if she provides any other law material, like maybe divorce or alimony law, she said that is the responsibility of the inmate's criminal lawyer. In fact, there are case decisions which indicate that inmates are entitled to access materials from their state's law, along with federal law, covering hundreds of matters. It was **recommended that she research this and contact companies that provide this service to inmates.**
2. Since pod and cell cleanliness is clearly an issue, **it is recommended that a Clean Pod/Cell Awards Program be considered by Program Manager Mullings.** Specifically, he might contact the several local casinos to get their used cards and give them to a winning unit. He might include the gathering of unused newspapers from local hotels given to the inmates. It might go as far as gathering from local bakeries any items that were not sold and do not create a health concern. This might be done on a weekly basis.
3. Since it seems that internal communication is a problem, **it is recommended that Director of Communications Brown create a monthly internal OCDC newsletter.** The contents could be multifaceted to include Trust actions, P&P updates, staff heroics, family occasions, and other information.
4. Upon reviewing some of the Vendor Contracts, **it is recommended that the CFO or other appropriate staff member be directed to closely monitor their contractual obligation and ensure compliance of all the sections with penalties assessed, if applicable.**
5. Most states have what is described as an Inmate Welfare Fund. This is the profit from Commissary sales efforts with companies like Keefe, the present commissary company. These monies are used to purchase items for the inmates like basketballs, law library services, or any service that directly serves inmates. This was discussed with the CFO.
6. The OCDC "Inmate Handbook" is presently a 48-page document in English with only pages 12-13 partially in Spanish. The national standard is that if the jail has a population of any ethnicity over 4% it must provide an Inmate Handbook in that language. The last census of Oklahoma County identified 11% Spanish speakers and most likely the jail represents a number close to this. Since most jail inmates are said to have a 5th grade education, it seems the handbook may be too complex. And 48 pages just seems to long and too expensive to provide to 80-100 inmates per day. It is recommended that a line-

staff team be directed to examine it for “what inmates really need to know.” This team might even include inmates.

7. Due to the destruction of the housing units caused by the inmates, the TRPs discussed the possible creation of an honor pod/dorm with many privileges. Some jails have created Veterans only pods and some with inmates over 45. These pods allow inmates out of cell from morning until late evening. There are multiple TVs including those in English and Spanish and provide headphones for each TV, so noise is limited. There might be a movie night with a popcorn machine brought in. Meals like breakfast are served buffet style during a specified time frame. In these, the inmates “generally” police themselves as they do not want to return to lockdown, but there are certainly rules that must be addressed.
8. A scan of some of the vendor contracts left some questions for further review by the OCDC Contract Monitor, including (notes were left in Mr. Monday’s report packet):
 - a. **Global Tel*Link Corporation:** Phones did not function regarding emergency phone numbers, but the contract gives 4 priority responses for problems? It mentions the provision of **340** tablets (notebooks?) for “Enhanced Services”, like Law Library access, PREA, etc. which we did not see?
 - b. **Turn Key Health Clinic:** The staff advised that they were 300 inmates behind in the 14-day health assessment of inmates’ requirement. The contract indicates “penalties” for this. The contract indicates 66.8 FTEs, but it was unclear how this was being met? They requested OCDC Training in PREA and CIT?
 - c. **Keefe Commissary Network:** Are inmates aware of the fees attached to the “pay card” they are given upon releases? Keefe should be asked to provide microwaves for the heating of water for their products needing same in pods.
 - d. **Summit Food Service:** Oven hoods were covered with grease residue (fire hazard). Is Section 3.5 “Cleaning” being met? What is the “E-Commerce Program and is it operational? **Section 3.2.G. Special Functions/Catering provides for Summit to cater functions for OCDC. What about the Administrative Staff holding a “family gathering” for each shift?**
 - e. **Pest Control:** We did not see this contract but there were numerous complaints from both inmates and staff regarding bed bugs, roaches, and mice?
9. Regarding “Use of Force” P&Ps, many jails have changed this “term” to “Response to Resistance”. With training under this term, a different mindset is possible.

This concludes this area of the Report.

Conclusion

First, the TRPs, Mr. Ryan, Mr. Cook and Mr. Jackson wish to fully acknowledge all the positive actions taken by the Administration, and supporting Trust, including stopping leaks, regaining air conditioning and much more physical facility corrections now in place. It must be an outstanding transitional environment from last July 2020. Second, it is clear and convincing that both administrative and operational staff have a loyalty to the OCDC, and that more interaction would only enhance this. Third, the discussion about building a “new jail” “or annex“, although valuable, is 5-7 years in the future. The jail’s operational and staffing problems need to be addressed now to reach that new construction. Fourth, it seems that although the Mission, Vision, and Values are certainly of value. A new team which crosses all levels, including Trust and line staff, should meet to consider updating for all to embrace. Lastly, none of the items, issues, thoughts, and considerations in this Report are “easy fixes” and clearly will require time. However, if the OCDC creates a written roadmap for resolution much can be accomplished over the next several years.

It is hoped that this Operational Assessment will serve as a catalyst for positive functional changes to the OCDC organization, its structure, its operations, and its culture. Our review is not intended to cast aspersions on any areas, but rather to offer observations, thoughts, and recommendations for making the operation better. As such, it is clear that all persons with whom we spoke were as eager, as we were, to improve the OCDC, its staff and its operations going into the future.

We sincerely appreciate the opportunity to share our thoughts. We want to thank all for the courtesy we were shown and Administrator Williams and his entire staff for the honest, forthright, and professional approach that was demonstrated during our technical assistance actions. We wish the best for the Oklahoma County Detention Center both now and into the future.

Appendix

Attachment I

Overview of Technical Assistance Activities

Prior to our visit, we coordinated our proposed activities with Administrator Greg Williams. We expressed our need to obtain some background information, as well as data regarding the operation of the Oklahoma County Detention Center (OCDC). Pursuant to this, we were provided with some materials before we arrived with additional documents and information upon arrival.

Upon our arrival in Oklahoma City (5/17/2021), we met with Administrator Greg Williams and Chief of Operations William Monday. We discussed elements of our Operational Assessment Plans, as well as issues and concerns pending inside the OCDC. We then made plans for the next morning's meetings with the OCDC leadership at the OCDC Headquarters.

On Tuesday, May 18, 2021, we drove to the jail and met with the Executive Staff for an Orientation Briefing, including:

- Greg Williams, Administrator
- William Monday, Chief of Operations
- Linda Johnson, Executive Assistant to the Administrator
- Tiffany Carter, Captain/Chief of Security
- AJ Milton, Captain/Chief of Intake and Release
- Megan Simpson, General Counsel
- Debra Hawkins, Health Services Administrator/Turn Key Health Clinics, LLC
- Dale Frey, Director of Facilities
- Don Givens, Director of Training
- Michele Minietta, Director of Human Resources
- Mark McCubbin, Chief Financial Officer
- Ronnie Aldridge, Safety Coordinator
- Jessica Brown, Director of Communications

We opened this meeting with introduction of ourselves Rollin Cook, Michael Jackson, and Tim Ryan. This was followed by introductions of others around the table. Within this, we explained our Technical Assistance Plans (TAP) and opened it for questions and comments.

Upon completion we initiated our initial tour of the building by visiting the 13th Floor (Medical Clinic). Over the next 48 hours we visited the following areas:

- Intake and Release
- Women's Pregnancy Housing (13th Floor)
- Juvenile Housing
- Mental Health Housing
- General Housing Areas
- Floor Recreation Area

- Quality Control Unit
- Policy and Procedure Unit
- Central Control
- Pod Control
- Damaged Housing Units
- Maintenance Area
- Kitchen
- Other Basement Units like storage
- Investigative Unit (Internal Affairs/Backgrounds)

While assessing the above the TRPs separated, from time to time, to conduct interviews with a trustee, directors, managers, supervisors, line staff, and inmates.

At 1:00 PM on Thursday, May 20, 2021, a preliminary exit briefing with Administrator Williams and Chief of Operations Monday. This was followed by a full exit briefing with the leadership team, including:

- Greg Williams, Administrator
- William Monday, Chief of Operations
- Jim Couch, Chair of the Trust
- Ben Brown, Trustee
- Tiffany Carter, Captain/Chief of Security
- AJ Milton, Captain/Chief of Intake and Release
- Sandra April, Lieutenant
- Megan Simpson, General Counsel
- Michele Minietta, Director of Human Resources
- Dale Frey, Director of Maintenance
- Jessica Brown, Director of Communications
- Mark McCubbin, Chief Financial Officer
- Bryne Beck, Accountant
- Rae Ann Pancey, Director of Nursing/Turn Key Health Clinic, LLC

Administrator Williams and the Trustees needed to leave about 2:30 PM for a general meeting with the community. The TRPs remained until 3:00 PM to finish the discussion and the Exit Briefing was closed.

Attachment II

Supplemental Report Prepared by Mr. Cook

The following report was prepared by Mr. Cook, in conjunction with the formal response, that has become the main body of Report #21J-1007. It provides unique and special insight into his observations, conclusions, and recommendations as a result of the site visit. Although his significant points have been incorporated into the above report, not every element is included. As such, this addendum has information that supports, in its own significant manner, the main report and is worthy of special review and discussion by the OCDC leadership and staff.

Mr. Cook's Notes from Oklahoma County Detention Center, OKC May 17-20

The information contained in this document is simply a regurgitation of notes taken and thoughts made during our visit and tour of the Oklahoma County Detention Center (OCDC). Obviously, a different tone was used for the protection of informants and an approach was used to ensure it is represented accurately. These notes were prepared in an effort to not trigger unnecessary consternation and frustration to an organization already experiencing significant challenges throughout. It is also not all inclusive. I tried to remember as much as I could and also reviewed my notes, but I certainly didn't cover every subject and every discovery.

General Hot Topics/Culture of More Inclusion Required

Several discussions were had around the hiring, training and retention process that need to be addressed. **Little to no communication and collaboration is going on** between HR, Investigations, and the Training division. Meetings to improve the process, discuss concerns and vet out potential solutions to challenges are non-existent.

Effective communication is lacking across the organization. Easy improvements to consider are things such as regular staff meetings, meetings with collaborating departments, town hall meetings for staff led by the Administrator and Chief of Operations, documents reviewed at briefings, strategic planning with operations present, opportunities to build relationships between administration and operational leadership, emails, texting, listening, empowering the operations leadership to solve some of the challenges (staffing, inmate management, safety/security, etc.) understanding that people support what they help create.

I honestly believe the administrative leadership and operational leadership are not that far apart and relations and communication can be improved with a sincere concerted effort on everyone's part. As with most effective communication, it requires concerted efforts on both sides to be successful.

Intake and Release

I received a limited amount of information from this area and most of it was from our initial facility tour and then a follow-up tour of the release area the final day on site. As with most areas

of the facility, it was unknown what minimal and optimal staffing would be for each shift. During our first tour, it appeared there were approximately 4-5 officers and a lieutenant in the area shared by intake and release. However, it was difficult to distinguish who was doing what job or who was in what job classification (officer, medical, social worker, etc.) The overall appearance of the area was typical for this facility in that it was in significant need of repair, cluttered, disorganized, poorly lit, and unkempt.

The intake search area was extremely congested and full of clutter (unnecessary items laying on the floor against the wall). Two arrests were being brought in at the same time and the poor design of the area added to what appeared to be a fairly lax atmosphere and an environment that could lead to dangerous situations considering the location and potential liability.

Several arresting officers were in the intake area waiting for paperwork, search completion, etc., but seemed to be able to roam wherever they wanted.

When I asked the Lieutenant what they did with combative and uncooperative intakes, he stated that they took them directly into the holding cells. They did not have individual cells to be able to isolate such challenging arrestees.

Benches were placed in the areas for the arrestees to sit while they waited, but again, there seemed to be little organization and attention to the safety and security of the area and the people within it. This doesn't mean the people working in this area do not care, it means they have become used to an environment and complacency has become prevalent.

Several arrestees were sitting on the bench with what appeared to be little to no supervision. This would make sense in a facility with strong inmate management, but of serious concern when it is not. We were also shown the areas for fingerprints, photographs, medical screening, etc., which exhibited what was noted above.

When I asked the Intake lieutenant to give me two things, he would like to see that would improve his work environment, he stated, "Get rid of all the leaks from the roof and move the medical screening that is currently stationed just past the searching station to outside in the garage/sally port." Apparently, they have made significant improvements upon the leaks that use to fill laundry carts full of water every day, but there were still areas where the water was clearly leaking from the ceiling.

The possibility of moving the medical screening from its current location may be something to consider ensuring this occurs prior to the person entering the facility but may need some significant review logistically.

The small releasing area also provided plenty of operational and security concerns. Although the officer/sergeant was doing the best with what she had, it was obvious she was being placed in a challenging situation.

The releasing area was small for what is required to occur each day. It was also directly connected to and crossed up with the intake area, which presents a significant security concern of inmates/arrestees attempting to take advantage of this situation and escape.

A filing cabinet existed in the area for unclaimed property. When the Sergeant was asked about the process, she didn't take any ownership in it or provide any logical explanation. She stated it had always been there and that's where she was told to place those items. Again, no inventory, biohazard, post order or policy about the proper handling.

There were certainly a number of operational and security related challenges in this area.

Housing Units

All of the units we toured were in poor condition. Damage to cells, windows, equipment, walls, lighting, phones, kiosks, tables, chairs, etc. Graffiti was found throughout the housing units. Many of the ceilings were leaking or had been leaking significantly in the recent past. Still many of the ceilings were hanging down, stained or corrupted.

Most of the shower areas were, at a minimum, not very sanitary and several were found to be clogged with standing water.

TVs were kept in the control rooms and placed so an inmate could only view it if out of his cell. Most of them had the sound turned off and were using closed caption.

One unit we visited was filled with smoke from a fire that had been set in a room (former cell) that had been turned into a "day room" type setting. Apparently, the inmate workers in the area often heat their water in this area with fire. Oddly, the entire unit was just going about their business, including staff responsible for the unit and the leadership providing us the tour. The smoke was thick enough that it should have warranted more attention and should have been setting off smoke alarms. Again, a sign of complacency setting in.

Policies, procedures, and post orders were basically non-existent, especially in any organized way inside the units.

According to those providing us the tours, contraband was of significant concern throughout the facility, but specifically the housing units. Cell phones and marijuana were found in the cells of the inmates who had started the fire for cooking.

According to leadership and the Director of Facilities most of the water challenges have been resolved. However, while we were there an inmate broke a phone off the wall and then used the parts from that to pull the new \$500 valve off the wall in his cell. This required a significant repair and took away water control from everyone below that cell. Again, the administration expressed their pleasure and appreciation that they have improved infrastructure; yet the operational side of housing was awful.

Some units are triple bunking by placing inmates on the floor. When asked why they aren't using the plastic boats, they stated most inmates don't like them and don't want them. Significant conditions of confinement concerns related to triple bunking and especially when one is directly on the floor.

Staff Training

My first meeting on Training was with Director Don Givens. He was part of the original group that was brought in by Administrator Williams to lead the changes and reform of the organization. He stated many of his ideas for change and improvement have been put on hold due to COVID restrictions.

He came to the meetings with the same documents we received in advance of our visit (2021 In-Service, 2021 On-Line, 2 Week Academy and Contract Staff Orientation).

He identified his two biggest challenges as space availability to conduct training and the short length of the academy. Currently, they are limited to some space in the basement, which is less than ideal. Otherwise, the current choice is training space available to them that is approximately 8 miles away from the jail. When asked if he had some suggested solutions, he stated he didn't see any changes considering current circumstances.

Director Givens also stated that the organization is in dire need of leadership training at all levels but felt due to the current circumstances surrounding jail operations, it was something that could wait for later.

I asked him if he had reached out to operations and other areas of the organization to gain their insight into what sort of training they would like to receive or could use to assist them in improving operations. He stated he had sent an email to Capt. Carter, but never received a response. I asked if he reached out to her again to see if she received it and he replied no he hadn't. Obviously, there is a **significant communication challenge** identified not only between training and operations, but much of the leadership team and operations.

Director Givens stated that he is providing 2 hours of PREA training and 2 hours of Offender Manipulations training to all newly hired personnel (custody, support and contracted). The document he provided for the academy only showed 1.5 hours of PREA and 2 hours of "Inmate Con Games."

Director Givens stated that they currently can only provide about 16 hours of in-service, but he would like to see that increased to 40 hours per year. He had no plan as to how this would be accomplished.

Director Givens stated that much of the **curriculum he has is outdated** (especially for in-service). Again, no plan as to how this could change. He did state, however, that he wanted to put an emphasis on de-escalation and effective communication training in the future.

An interview was also conducted with Lt. Lanice King (13 years with department), who came in on her day off to participate. Lt. King was very impressive. Very well spoken, professional appearance, positive attitude, and a genuine willingness to improve training and the overall operations of the facility. Due to her openness and ability to engage I asked her questions beyond training. Although the responses to many of these questions were not positive, that certainly was not her tone. She expressed sincere intent to be a part of the solution rather than part of the problem and was not attempting to throw blame upon anyone. Lt. King understood this was an organizational challenge, not a time to point fingers at each other.

She expressed concern that the current training director could be more engaged in his assignment. He seldom provides any of the in-service or academy training and has left that task to her and the Training Sergeant. There seems to be a significant disconnect between the two, both had tremendous ideas and input, but didn't seem to be on the same page operationally.

There was a concern raised that the new hires, volunteers, contractors, and service providers were not receiving PREA training. However, when I reached out and questioned this of the Director, he was able to provide me with training records that indicated they have been completing the training since January of 2021. There wasn't a way we could verify this, but it seemed to be meeting the expectation.

Lt. King went on to review the in-service training model, which was similar to the explanations provided by the Director. Additional thoughts shared, included a description of Cultural Diversity training that is offered each year with a different topic (LGBTQI, Racial Inequities, etc.). Also, this year will be about religious differences. They also receive crime scene protection, use of force, legal updates, defensive tactics, and some communication training.

She stated that during her 13 years with the department there have been a variety of lengths to the academy training depending on the current leadership, staffing, emergencies, etc. (6 week, 4-week, 3 week and now 2 weeks). She expressed significant concern that the new detention officers are not receiving enough training in a variety of areas prior to their placement inside the facility where they move to a more hands on experience.

There is no official FTO program, the officers are assigned to the shifts and are basically given the hands-on experience by performing the duties. She mentioned that there have been a couple newly hired officers that have either been in the academy or have been assigned to the shifts that were later disqualified due to a failure in their criminal history/background check. Including one that was a documented gang member from another county in Oklahoma.

This misunderstanding or miscommunication seems to be attributed to the on-going culture and communication challenges being faced throughout the organization.

Lt. King was concerned with the failure to effectively recruit solid candidates to come work for the department. She suggested they get back to recruiting at the high school where they were able to find solid candidates in the past. (Note: The detention officers and other staff only need to be 18 to work for the department.)

The final concern raised by Lt. King was around policies and procedures. She stated that she was able to obtain a flash drive from the policy analyst (Ethel), but that shows that most of the employees within the jail no longer have access to them. This was also true regarding post orders. She was aware that they were working on policies and procedures but was concerned it was taking too long and was leaving the employees without guidance. As with the operational captains, she expressed concern that changes have occurred to the operations that is not covered in policy.

Conditions of Confinement

The civil rights of both inmates and staff are being jeopardized by the following:

- Air flow (poor smoke removal);
- Unsure about smoke detectors and fire suppression system effectiveness;
- Broken, damaged, dirty ceiling tile and false ceilings;
- Showers plugged and unsanitary conditions;
- Report of bed bugs, cockroaches, and mice;
- Broken windows, walls, equipment, doors, tables, etc.;
- Holes between cells and to the outside of the facility;
- Inmates laying on mattresses on the floor of cells designed for two (triple bunking);
- Dirty floors, especially near doorways and along the walls;
- Dirty elevators; and also...

Meals left in trays on (non-heated or refrigerated) carts near the elevator waiting to be delivered to the floor. When asked how long they sit there, we were told it depends. They did state, however, that the officers are supposed to be checking the temperature of the trays upon arrival to the units and reporting anything out of policy.

Keefe employees and leadership complained of a significant rodent problem existing in the commissary area. They showed me some traps that have been set, but they state the problem continues.

There was an unusual post where a person/employee was sitting at a sewing machine performing a remedial function regarding inmate clothing. The bigger challenge was that there was some sort of staff store that she was running where she made a variety of items for the employees to purchase that she made on the machine. No one was able to say who accounts for the money or where the money goes.

During our tour we made our way through the dry storage and some sort of records storage left behind by the Sheriff's office. No one had a key, but this is an area that should be inventoried, reviewed and any documents beyond the retention schedule should be removed and destroyed.

Poor conditions of confinement lead to serious security concerns.

Security

Again, there were many issues. Here are a few that caught my eye:

No real check point for staff, contractors and volunteers entering the facility. We were told it was removed due to lack of proper staffing. Employees, contractors, volunteers, and others were walking into the facility with not only clear bags, but also full-size back packs, etc. unchecked;

Not all people entering were required to wear identification (including us) or display it accordingly. One contractor standing at the entrance of the elevators looked like an everyday person on the street. It could have easily been an inmate in stolen or contraband clothes escaping custody. No one questioned him and no one stopped him;

Contraband control was expressed as a concern by all staff interviewed and was actually easily confirmed from walking around and observing housing units and cells. In addition, marijuana and several cell phones were found in an inmate worker's cell during our visit;

Lack of policy, procedures, and post orders readily available to all employees was a serious concern;

Little to no inmate management, interaction, engagement, etc. left much room for problems;

During our facility tour a main garage door leading outside the facility had been left unattended and open.

Just outside that garage door was the vehicle exit for the facility. The captain over the area secured the door and stated she would track down who had left it open.

As noted, there seemed too little attention to security due to complacency, in general, leading to conclusions that security and safety is in constant jeopardy.

Inmate Management

Honestly, this could be a 10-page document in and of itself. There is little to no inmate management that is truly occurring, at this time, due to staffing, training, operational failures, internal and external challenges, contraband, hostage situation history personnel challenges, etc.

It would be beneficial for the leadership and management team to do some research, training, discussions, etc. and put together a pilot unit that they can attempt to improve this aspect of their challenges. It is critical operations staff be included in this idea by having them submit proposals that can be considered for pilot implementation.

Interviews were conducted with three Captains (Tiffany Carter, AJ Milton, and Kevin Wagner). Captains Carter and Milton spent most of the first day with us and also provided information throughout. My notes from those interactions and interviews are as follows:

I asked them what was good about their jobs, the organization, and the facility...

Good - The possibility of new and improved operations, the fact that we were there to help them, new leadership, morale improving, pay improved, medical and custody working well together, *some* ideas being considered, staff are open to change and improvement, training staff is solid, utilizing staff better, culture is changing, improved use of force critiques and employees want to believe good things are coming.

Difficulties included:

Impossible to effectively manage the inmate population when they are so short staffed;

People are coming to work without proper training, especially in areas around communication, de-escalation, etc.

Stated that employees are starting the day they were interviewed without receiving any training. In fact, detention officers have been hired and sent to the facility to work that were escorted out of the facility as a known gang member in another county.

They stated the hiring, interview and background process is very unorganized and unprofessional. They would like to see the organization focus on quality over quantity in the hiring process. Too many of those they are getting at this point are not high-quality individuals.

It was openly expressed that there is little to no communication/transparency about what is going on in the department from the executive leadership level. They did not meet with the operations leadership upon their arrival. They have not reached out to the operations leadership for input on operational changes, etc.

They have not been provided the opportunity to provide any insight into the in-service and academy training.

A big concern shared by all of them was the lack of structured policy, procedures, and post orders. Although we found some unorganized and outdated versions did exist in some places, they were far from adequate.

They stated that staff meetings are occurring once a month, but there is little collaboration or opportunities to share operational insight. One way communication.

All of them expressed significant concerns around the availability of contraband, the lack of entry/exit check points and an overall lax approach to safety and security. However, they expressed a belief in the Director and COO, but would like more opportunities to engage and to be included in the solutions going forward.

Other Interviews and Information

We conducted an interview with HR Director Michelle Minietta. My notes from that are as follows:

She stated she has two employees working for her. One assists with personnel matters and the other is responsible for time keeping;

She expressed frustration with the department's lack of progressive technology, which leads to many unproductive and repetitive tasks;

She stated that the hiring process was "chaotic," but didn't provide any sort of solution to the problem other than improved databases and technology;

She talked about the incentive they provide to employees who recruit someone to work for the department. If the new employee stays for six months, the recruiting person receive a \$2000 stipend;

She confirmed that they are hiring people as quickly as they can, including when someone walks in and says they want a job. They are interviewing and hiring them on the spot;

She was unable to answer the question posed, "Who is approving the early or extra quick hires."

We conducted an interview early in our visit with Debra Hawkins from the Health Services Provider (Turnkey). My notes from that are as follows:

Staffing is challenging – especially during the need for sufficient staff to conduct med passing and on the weekends;

They are still very backed up on completing their 14-day evaluations, but feel they have made significant strides in this area since they became the provider;

They have made significant strides in the control of COVID throughout the facility. They are providing vaccinations at intake for those available and willing to participate. They are no longer requiring a 10-day isolation upon arrival;

Emergency response to the facility is good. Fire department is close by for support; They are currently utilizing EMT to assist them with triage of injuries and situations, and she feels like that has been a successful program for them;

When asked about how many grievances they are seeing each month, she told us that last month there were 13. Most are about bed bugs and similar vermin;

She expressed significant concern that the “sick call system” was “broken” and that they are not able to receive communication from the inmate population as easily as they should;

Morbidity reviews are occurring following an inmate death.

Overall, she expressed a need for the operational/detention staff to receive CIT training and it was suggested that NIC could assist with some Mental Health First Aid Training. Turnkey believes in a more humane approach to mental health treatment and would eventually like the facility to achieve NCCHC accreditation.

I conducted an interview of Sgt. Zakiya Biers at the request of Lt. King and Captains Carter and Milton. They stated she wanted to express her concerns around the current programming situation, as follows:

Much of her frustration seems to stem from being removed from programming and not seeing much of any programming occurring since her departure. She obviously takes great pride in the programs that were occurring under her direction and prior to COVID and the new Director;

For example, before she left this assignment there was NA, AA, Creative Writing, Celebrate Community, PAWS, Woman in Transition, GED, HS Diploma, etc. Now there is next to nothing offered and she is seeing the negative impacts it is having on the incarcerated and the operations.

She mentioned that the new Director of Programming attempted to do a Prison Fellowship event that failed miserably. When I spoke to the Director, I received just the opposite response. In fact, he said this is what he plans to base his other programs on in the future;

When I asked if there had been any communication between herself (the others involved in programming) and the new Director, she stated there was none and they have seen next to nothing from him since he arrived. COVID aside she feels like no one is working to get things off the ground again.

I conducted an interview with the Program Director Mack Mullings. He stated that he started in his present position on July 1, 2020, and was formerly a local talk show host on the radio and is a recovering addict who has been clean for 5 years. He has no previous experience providing programming in correctional facilities. However, he certainly seemed more than willing to engage and be part of the solution. He stated he had reached out to Fairfax County and Tulsa County for some ideas around programming and was hopeful to implement those in the near future. He was advised to contact NIC for the provision of more contact information that could help him with correctional programming.

Director Mullings seems to be an idea guy and seemed to be looking for direction and leadership to get him moving in the right direction. He was open to our feedback and appeared to have a

genuine drive to get things going but seemed to not know the direction he needed to go. With the right guidance and leadership he could likely bring some real energy and innovation to the position. **However, there also needs to be more communication between him, his leadership and those in operations. Again, there is a real challenge regarding effective and productive communications across the organization.**

I had a brief interview with the new Director of Health and Safety, Ronnie Aldridge. He was almost as new as us in that this was his first week. However, he used to provide maintenance service inside the facility between 2005-14. He stated the state and upkeep of the facility was not like this at that time. He had some other opportunities to come into the facility after 2014 and said it seemed to take a down-turn around 2018. He appears to be a person more than qualified to do the job and has set the priority in his first week to address anything he views as life and safety issues.

Important Miscellaneous Points

Staff expressed concerns surrounding the appearance of nepotism with the hiring of friends and family since the Trust leadership has taken over. Specifically, the new dry storage and property supervisor is the wife or future wife of the HR Manager. No one is sure if this was handled like a typical hiring process or if the person was simply put in place because she is the significant other of the HR Director. Such actions create "rumors" that foster misinformation surrounding the organization.

Staff expressed a concern that an unqualified person was brought in to be the Director of Programming resulting in the removal of those who were in the position previously. I interviewed the new Director, which I shared in another area and found him to be ready to move forward with programming, but seemed a bit confused as to how to proceed. Attention needs to be given to this area and leadership should be providing some direction.

It was identified that a majority of the administrative leadership work from home and are seldom at work (beyond COVID reasons). Specifically, it is viewed that the HR Director works mostly from home and the Director of Training puts most of his focus on "hiring interviews" and little time teaching and providing training. Within this there seems to be little to no respect for the role the captain might play in training leaving most of the responsibility to the Lieutenant.

Multiple staff expressed significant concern with the lack of safety and security throughout the facility and says that it has gotten progressively worse since the Sheriff left. For example, not everyone is required to wear identification and they have witnessed multiple people in areas they should not be without proper escort. For example, the PIO is allowed to go throughout the facility without any identification, as well as speak to inmates without proper notice to the housing unit officers and leadership. This complacency or lack of understanding safety and security will certainly lead to challenges down the road if left unchecked.

It was shared by several operational staff that most of the people brought in by the administration lack the necessary background to understand a jail's operations (Note: However, at the same

time, most reiterated that they feel that Administrator Williams and Chief of Operations Monday have been working hard since their arrival and do understand corrections operations).

It was a pleasure working with the NIC team and the entire OCDC staff. I hope this information is helpful in the preparation of the final report.

Sincerely,

Rollin Cook, TRP Partner on TAP #21J-1007

Attachment III

Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Trust/Jail Trust



***Members of the Oklahoma
County Criminal Justice
Authority, or "jail trust"***

*Tricia Everest
Jim Couch
Sue Ann Arnall
Francie Ekwerekwu
Kevin Calvey
Ben Brown
Todd Lamb
M.T. Berry
Tommie Johnson**

Brown said one of the greatest challenges the trust faces is not political controversy, but rather the material condition of the jail.

“I think conditions are better,” he said. “But that’s limited somewhat to the physical condition as it is. The use of the COVID money on some repairs made to the heating and air system were good. There were parts of that jail that hadn’t seen fresh air in years. That is being repaired. The sewage system that’s broken is being repaired. But there’s still a lot more to be fixed.”

Blumert praised jail administrator Greg Williams, who is tasked with putting the trust’s policies into action. She said many of those improvements, such as getting rid of Styrofoam containers and changing food vendors, don’t get much attention.

Brown also praised Williams and agreed that the trust has made some clear improvements.

The Oklahoma County Jail has been plagued by trouble since it opened in 1991. Billed as a state-of-the-art, ultra-modern facility, design flaws were apparent almost immediately. Within the jail’s first half decade, at least three prisoners successfully broke out. One inmate used a spork to chisel away at a window to escape. Another used coat hooks to successfully break through hollow concrete blocks, according to a story in *The Oklahoman*.

More recently, an inmate used a bed sheet to escape from a 12th floor cell.

But perhaps most disturbing are reports of numerous human and civil rights violations within the jail’s walls, as detailed in a 2008 report by the U.S. Department of Justice. The report outlined issues with overcrowding, staffing and inmate supervision, among other problems. When inspectors visited the facility in 2007 they found more than 2,400 inmates in a facility designed for half that many.

The jail continues to be under oversight of the U.S. Department of Justice, a status it has held since 2009, because of the many violations found in the report.

Inmate deaths have, nevertheless, continued to be a regular occurrence. In the five-year period between 2014 and 2019, 45 inmates died in jail custody.

Attachment IV

Powers and Duties of the Trustees (re: Jail Operations)

Trust Indenture

Oklahoma County Criminal Justice Authority

June 10, 2019

Article VIII, Sections 37, 38, 39

- (37) Upon establishment and adoption of this Trust Indenture, the Sheriff shall continue to operate the Jail Facilities until such time as the Authority and the Beneficiary shall enter into a lease agreement and/or funding agreement(s) that specifically provides for the Authority to commence responsibility for management and operation of the Jail Facilities in any of the lawful manners described herein. Prior to the Authority expressly assuming such management and operational responsibilities, the Authority is hereby directed by the Beneficiary to evaluate operational and management alternatives through an RFP process or as otherwise described in paragraph (36) herein, and the Sheriff is hereby directed by the Beneficiary to provide reasonable access to the Jail Facilities and to the financial, operational, and procedural records relating thereto as will enable the Authority to effectively consider such alternatives.
- (38) To develop by-laws and or policies and procedures to address administration of the Jail Facilities identified hereunder to meet the following goals, including but not limited to (i) providing for the efficient processing and release of inmates in a timely manner following and order of release or posting bond; (ii) providing accountability and openness in the operations by providing Trustees access to the facilities and books and records; (iii) addressing space and time constraints relative to inmates having the opportunity to visit with attorneys or caseworkers regarding their pending proceedings; (iv) limit potential conflicts of interest between the Trustees and operations of the Jail Facilities; (v) provide for adequate recreation and sufficient out-of-cell time for detainees; (vi) eliminate existing jail triple calling; (vii) ensure that all relevant standards established by Oklahoma State Statutes prescribed and established for county jails including, but not limited to, standards concerning internal and perimeter security, discipline of inmates, employment of inmates, and proper food, clothing, housing, medical care, security, sanitary conditions, diet, living space, discipline, prisoner's rights, staff training, safety, prisoner supervision and segregation of females, minors and the infirm are followed.
- (39) The Authority and the Trustees and all persons or entities acting on their behalf including private entities or contractors shall follow and comply with any of the rules and regulations established by the Presiding Judge of the Seventh Judicial District of the State of Oklahoma or orders of any Judge of the District Court and will be fully responsive to the reasonable and necessary requests and directives of all Judges of the District Court, as required by existing law.

Attachment V

Detention Officer Academy Curriculum

Day 1

0800 – Orientation to OCCJA

0830 – Safety rules and Regulations

0930 – New Employee Paperwork

1030 – ID Badges

1100 – Uniforms

1200 – Employee Conduct and Dress Code

1230 – Lunch

1330 – Health and Safety

Blood-borne pathogens, PPE, injury reporting, cell phone use, drugs and alcohol, power tools, ladders, Hazardous Communications, Lockout/Tag out, Fire Extinguishers, SCBA/Respirators, Health, and fitness

1700 – Dismissed

Day 2

0800 – PREA

0930 – TB shots, Hep B – Turnkey Medical

1000 - Maintaining Logbooks, Inmate Counts

1130 – Legal Issues for Correctional Officers

1230 – Lunch

1330 – Inmate Con Games

1530 – Radio Communications

1600 – Jail Tour

1700 – Dismissed

Day 3

0700 – Day 1 & 2 Test

0800 – Intro to City and County Facility Standards, Intro to NIMS

0900 – Key and Tool Control

1000 – City and County Detention Facility Standards Quiz #1/ Review

1100 – City and County Detention Facility Standards Quiz #2/Review

1200 – Lunch

1300 – Intro to Ethics in Corrections

1500 – Offender Rules and Regulation

1730 – Dismissed

Day 4

0700 – City and County Facility Standards Quiz #3/Review

0800 – County Benefits

1200 – Lunch

1300 – Turnkey Medical – Offender withdraw training for Officers

1400 – Turnkey Medical – Special Needs inmates

1500 – Cultural Diversity, Drop by Drop

1600 – City and County Facility Standards Quiz #4/Review

1730 – Dismissed

Day 5

0700 – Day 3 & 4 Test

0800 – Heart Save First Aid/CPR

1200 – Lunch

1300 – Safety Procedures (Fire and Emergency)

1500 – City and County Facility Standards Quiz #5/Review

1630 – Grievance and Disciplinary Procedures

1730 – Dismissed

Day 6

0700 – Day 5 Test

0800 – City and County Facility Standards Final Test

1000 – Suicide Prevention (Mental Health)

1100 – Use of Force Policy

1200 – Lunch

1300 – Report Writing

1500 – Search Techniques

1630 – Defensive Tactics/ Custody and Control

1730 – Dismissed

Day 7

0700 – Defensive Tactics/ Custody and Control

1200 – Lunch

1300 – Defensive Tactics/ Custody and Control

1730 – Dismissed

Day 8

0700 – Defensive Tactics/ Custody and Control

1200 – Lunch

1300 – OC Spray Classroom

1530 – OC Certification

1730 - Dismissed

2021 Online

Emergency Procedures

Basic and Advanced Security Procedures

Blood-borne Pathogens

Hostage Survival

Interpersonal Communications

Key Control

Preventing Sexual and Other Unlawful Harassment

Restraints

Riots and Disturbances

Sexual Misconduct

Suicide Prevention

Verbal De-Escalation

City and County Detention Facility Standards

The OODA LOOP

2021 IN-SERVICE

Day 1

0730 – Transportation of Inmates

0900 – Employee Conduct Standards, Uniform, (policy updates)

0915 - Character First (Cultural Diversity)

1000 – Legal Issues in Corrections

1100 – Use of Force Class refresher

1200 – Lunch

1300 – Log books (sight checks, radio communications, and emergency pro)

1400 – Report Writing

1530 – Disciplinary/Grievance

1630 – Gang Intelligence

1730 – Dismissed

Day 2

0730 – CPR Refresher

0845 – Combative Intake/Officer Induced Jeopardy

0945 – OC Spray Update

1030 – Health and Safety Updates

1200 – Lunch

1300 – Defensive Tactics

1730 - Dismissed

Contract Staff Orientation (2021)

Conducted the last Tuesday of each month.

0800 – PREA (prison rape elimination act)

1000 – Inmate Con Games

1200 – Dismissed

Attachment VI

**NIC TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE STATEMENT OF WORK
EVENT #21J1007 – OPERATIONAL ASSESSMENT**

The Technical Resource Provider (TRP) will act as the lead TRP and conduct a three-day, on-site operational assessment of the Oklahoma County Detention Center in Oklahoma City, OK. The Lead TRP will review of the following areas: (1) intake & release (2) housing units (3) policy and procedures (4) staff training (5) conditions of confinement and overall sanitation (6) security (7) inmate management. The goal is for the Oklahoma County Detention Center staff to have a complete operational assessment for them to use as a guide as they consider their current operations and possible opportunities to enhance their services.

Location: 210 N. Shartel Ave., Oklahoma City, OK 73102

Timeframe: Preferably as soon as possible but no later than 1 year from award date.

Requirements:

1. To prepare for on-site work, the lead TRP will:
 - a. Make initial contact with NIC Correctional Program (CPS) Specialist, Mike Jackson, at (202)616-9565 or mpjackson@bop.gov to discuss this technical assistance and establish future communication requirements.
 - b. Make initial contact with the agency representative to discuss the scope of the technical assistance.
 - c. Coordinate event dates, preparation and on-site activities with the co-TRP and agency representative.
 - d. Request and review documentation relevant to the scope of the technical assistance including, but not limited to, jail inspections, staffing plans, post orders, policy and procedures, program schedules, housing plan, mission statement, and service contracts.
 - e. Request and review documentation on any current litigation, court rulings, consent decrees, and/or other relevant legal issues.
 - f. Prepare and provide agency representative an agenda for the technical assistance event.
2. While on-site, the lead TRP will:
 - a. Meet with agency representative and other designated staff to establish a mutual understanding of the intent and scope of the technical assistance.
 - b. Review the established agenda and discuss any requested modifications. Contact the CPS immediately if the agency's request(s) is not within the scope of work.
 - c. Review any documentation or contracts relevant to the scope of work not previously received.

- d. Conduct a thorough tour of the facility. The tour should familiarize the lead TRP with the layout, staffing areas, inmate housing, intake and releasing, medical, food service, general operations, and provide the lead TRP an opportunity to speak with staff and inmates.
 - e. Conduct interviews with line, supervisory, key, and other designated staff.
 - f. Conduct a formal debrief with executive team of the agency and other designated key personnel, and provide observations, preliminary findings, and recommendations.
3. The lead TRP must compile and submit a technical assistance report for review within two weeks of the completed technical assistance event.
 - a. The report should generally follow the format and instructions described in the NIC "Technical Assistance Policies" (<http://nicic.gov/downloads/general/tapolicies.pdf>) including an overview of the TRP's on-site activities and a complete set of materials prepared in connection with the technical assistance event, i.e., agenda, handouts, etc.
 - b. Submit an electronic copy of the technical assistance report to (1) the detention center point of contact and (2) the NIC Correctional Program specialist for simultaneous review.
 - c. Edit the report and send the finalized version to (1) Detention Center Director and (2) the NIC Jails Division Technical Assistance Manager.
 4. The TRP must have a minimum of ten (10) years of experience in managing inmate services and jail operations.
 5. The TRP must have a minimum of five (5) years of experience facilitating meetings and adult instructional learning.

Type of Contract:

This award will be a firm fixed price. A firm fixed price contract provides for a price that is not subject to any adjustment on the basis of the contractor's cost experience in performing the contract. The contractor quote must be all inclusive of any fees and expenses (travel costs) associated with providing requested services.

Non Personnel Status:

This service is a contractual arrangement and not a personnel appointment. Payment will be based on the provision of an end product. This service does not constitute an employer/employee relationship. The Contractor will not be subject to government supervision, except for performance monitoring and security related matters.

Attachment VII

Timothy P. Ryan, CJM, MPA, BS
Ryan Correctional Consulting Services, PLLC
3333 Rice Street, #203
Miami, FL 33133-5299
TimSueRYAN@aol.com
786-999-5096

April 28, 2021

Greg Williams, Director
Oklahoma County Detention Center
201 N. Shartel
Oklahoma City, OK 73102

Subject: Tentative Agenda and Materials Request (re: NIC Technical Assist #21J-1007)

Dear Director Williams:

On April 9, 2021, I was advised by the Bureau of Prisons, NIC Jails Division, Technical Assistance Unit, that the Oklahoma County Detention Center Technical Assistance Grant Request was approved, and that I had been selected as the Lead Technical Resource Provider (TRP). Pursuant to that, I, along with Mr. Rollin Cook have been authorized to conduct a technical assistance review which, pursuant to mutual agreement, has been scheduled for May 18-20, 2021. In conjunction with this, I have made contact with Michael Jackson of NIC who will be assisting us as well. With this, it is our intent to focus our "Operational Assessment" on the areas of concern you mentioned.

Specifically, pursuant to direction given to us, we were asked to "... conduct a three-day, on-site operational assessment of the Oklahoma County Detention Center to include, at a minimum, a review of the following areas: (1) intake & release, (2) housing units, (3) policy and procedures, (4) staff training, (5) conditions of confinement and overall sanitation, (6) security, (and) (7) inmate management. The goal is for the Oklahoma County Detention Center staff to have a complete operational assessment for them to use as a guide as they consider their current operations and possible opportunities to enhance their services.

With that in mind, I would respectfully advise and request the following:

1. It is our plan to arrive on Monday, May 17, 2021, lodging at the Embassy Suites located at 1815 S Meridian Ave., Oklahoma City, OK 73108 (Phone: 405-682-6000. We are planning to be available for contact Monday evening if you are available.
2. It would be our hope to meet with you, and/or others, as you deem appropriate, at 8:30 AM on Tuesday, May 18th. At this time we would like to again discuss any items of particular concern, as well as gain an enhanced understanding of the jail's operation and its facility design from an administrative perspective. This will include the questions and information requested attached to this letter (see #4).

3. Enclosed is a tentative agenda/itinerary (Attachment I). Please have it reviewed and make any adjustments as may be deemed appropriate. Additionally, please add anything that you desire needing special review. This is a very general outline and will most likely change once we are on site.
4. Enclosed is a copy of the "General Audit Outline" of important items being addressed by American Jails, and of which, we, in assessing respective responses, may use as information for our Report (Attachment II). It is very lengthy and is not intended to be entirely touched during our review. However, we will use it as part of our general discussions with the leadership team, staff, and inmates focusing on how the responses may affect today's facility operations, as well as give guidance to possible future facility planning and design.
5. Prior to our arrival, it would be of value to have your office provide as many of the following items that may be readily available. These include, but we fully recognize, that many may not be available due to the unique nature of the "take-over" last year:

Corrections Department Table of Organization;

Present jail budget and staffing plan inclusive of a detailed line-items of the jail's maintenance budget for the last 5 years, along with, actual expenditures for the same period, plus any related capital improvement budget items and actions over the entire operational period of the jail;

Staffing deployments and schedules for the jail;

Oklahoma State Laws governing jail operations;

Any regulations required and/or voluntarily addressed, such as any jail standards (Oklahoma Model Jail Standards) and recent audits, any other State Sheriff's Association Standards (Oklahoma Corrections Accreditation Commission, if exists) and audits, or others that might regulate operations (Internal Audits in last 5-10 years);

Any County Charter Sections, Ordinances, Resolutions, or Commission and/or Manager Directives guiding the jail's operation;

Copies of any criminal justice related Master Planning Documents prepared in the last 10 years, particularly if it discusses the jail;

Copies of any special and/or unique reports prepared like a PREA Audit and response documents, Minutes from the Trust meetings regarding the jail facility design, construction, and/or operations, any reports/minutes from Commission Meetings where the jail's facility and/or operations related to the facility design and/or construction were discussed, etc.;

A Table of Contents for all appropriate jail policy and procedure manuals and/or a full copy of said manuals (including classification process (see below), suicide prevention procedures, use of force policies, mentally ill protocols, medically/ADA compromised inmate procedures, and high-profile inmate protocols, etc.).

A listing of all emergency procedures;

A short, general history of the jail facility, itself, from its inception to today to include original architectural diagrams, plus any modifications, additions, etc. to include present video monitoring operations, visiting locations and procedures, interview areas, recreation/programming/education areas, etc.;

An outline of the facility's general design including the jail's rated capacity versus its actual operational model, as well as its inmate supervision model including direct supervision versus any indirect (linear) supervision housing areas;

A copy of the State or other Training Standards for all employees, certified and civilian, to include academy, if required, in-service, promotional, etc. (Note: If there are Training Manuals/Curriculum that are available, please include);

Any private vendor contracts like medical/mental health, food service, commissary, maintenance, pest control, etc.;

Any controlling legal actions like consent decrees or settlement documents including personnel/union actions, if applicable;

If national accreditation standards have been met, please provide acknowledging documents;

A copy of the Inmate handbook, as well as any Citizen Information Pamphlets;

A schedule of inmate activities like visiting, court movement, recreation, laundry exchange, lock down, count, as well as inmate programs, etc.;

A copy of the jail's website;

We certainly would be interested in historical information but understand that it may not be available. But if you can, copies of the latest Jail Management Reports including copies of the latest Jail Management Reports including Average Daily Population (ADP) for 2020/21 and before, average booking and release numbers by day of the week and time of the day, average length of stay numbers (ALOS) to include the top 10 inmates having the longest in custody periods to date, inclusive of charges, bail, number of court appearances, listing of any significant housing issues relative to each, as well as the numbers of inmates housed over 1 year, inmate grievance details (specifically relative to facility issues), and critical incidents of a significant nature occurring over the last five years (escapes, in custody deaths, suicides, inmate disturbances/assaults, inclusive of inmate on staff events, and others that may have relevance to facility design);

A copy of the Classification Plan including initial/subsequent forms, and rules relative to Administrative Segregation/PC/Transgender/Discipline area rules, PREA Standards Application, LEP (Limited English Proficiency), Secure Communities, if used, Faith – Based Programming, Hearing Impaired/ADA Policies, Rehabilitative Services, and any other important procedures.

I recognize that this is a long list and may be difficult to put together prior to our arrival. Given this, please put together only what is readily available and, if possible, simply create a couple of binders of the available materials for us on our arrival May 18th. Thank you.

6. Given the nature of your request, we believe it might be appropriate to have discussions with persons other than those in the Corrections Center. Although we are not sure of whom to contact, it seems that it might be of value to consider meeting with some of the following (if deemed of value) including the Chief Judge, Public Defender, State Attorney, County Attorney representing the Center and Trust, representative of Police Chiefs, and possibly, a County Commissioners and/or the Manager. Further, if there is a Criminal Justice Coordinating Council and/or similar entity, seemingly, it would be of value to discuss the issues with a representative. Additionally, if there is/are union/s representing staff, other collective bargaining elements, and/or important employee groups who may have information that would be helpful, it seems discussion with a representative may be valuable. If appropriate, could you please have this coordinated for us as well? (Note: This seemingly might best be set up for Thursday morning.)

It is our sincere hope that our review will help make the Oklahoma County Detention Center a model others will want to emulate. Thank you for giving us the opportunity to share our experiences, ideas, and recommendations.

See you in a couple of weeks.

Sincerely yours,

Timothy P. Ryan, Lead Technical Resource Person (TRP)

cc: Rollin Cook, Rollin Cook Consulting
Michael Jackson, NIC Jails Division, Correctional Program Specialist

Attachment I

**Oklahoma County Detention Center - County Jail
Oklahoma City, Ok
NIC Technical Assistance Grant #16J-1049
Proposed Itinerary and Agenda for Site Assessment
May 18-20, 2021**

Tim Ryan, Florida; Rollin Cook, Utah, and Michael Jackson, NIC/CPS, Washington, DC: Technical Resource Providers (TRPs)

Tuesday, May 18, 2021:

8:30 AM: Meet with Director Williams and Administrative Staff:

9:00 AM: Meet with Jail Management Team:

Review/define areas/issues of particular concern to include jail safety and security, facility construction and design, any litigation pending or completed addressing jail operations, and organizational structure (including staff roles, shift manager concept, shift duty differences, teamwork collaboration opportunities, and days off/shift schedules examination);

Discuss operational, administrative, and philosophical perspectives;

Determine if there are any special interests and identify their perspectives;

Identify and discuss jail history, county population/demographics, future expectations, and jail needs/trends;

Discuss "Audit Questionnaire" and its applicability to Oklahoma County Detention Center operations.

10:00 AM: Begin comprehensive jail tour:

This tour will probably best be guided as determined by jail staff; however, it may be appropriate to begin with the arrestee/intake/booking process through initial classification, housing and facility exit;

In so doing, examine processes in housing areas (general, male/female/juvenile (if appropriate), control rooms, and specialty areas such as medical/mental health housing, administrative segregation, suicidal monitoring, recreation, libraries, inmate programs, etc.

Support areas to include food service, clinics, laundry, maintenance, administration, training, armory, etc.

Noon: Lunch in the facility (inmate/staff meals).

1:00-5:00 PM: Continue the tour and begin independent assessments as the tour may dictate to include areas such as training, food services, court functions, mail, laundry, and other which might include a return in the evening.

Wednesday, May 19, 2021:

8:00 AM-Noon: Continue with tours, inspections, reviews as deemed appropriate, to include:

Documents review of policies/procedures/post orders; training curriculum and manuals; staffing plan; therapeutic menu manual; emergency response protocols like power failure, riot, tornados, pandemic diseases, inmate death, etc.;

Staff/inmate interviews to include managers of facility maintenance, budget, human resources, food service, medical/mental health, classification, intake, inmate programs, etc.

Noon: Lunch with Jail Management, if appropriate.

1:00-5:00 PM: Continue as identified above, as needed.

Thursday, May 20, 2021:

8:00-Noon: Continue assessment as may be decided;

Conduct any other interviews deemed appropriate by Director such as representative of the Trust, county leaders, chiefs of police, employee group representatives, judiciary, state attorney, public defender, etc.;

Site visits of any areas missed;

Noon: Lunch as a NIC Team and Director;

1:00: Continue with above as may be needed.

2:30-3:30: Prepare for exit interview with Director and Staff.

3:30-5:00: Conduct an exit interview with the Director and all others deemed appropriate.

Note: The above is very general and is subject to revision as deemed appropriate.

Attachment II

General Audit Questionnaire (Preliminary Solicitation)
Oklahoma County Detention Center – Jail
Oklahoma City, Oklahoma
May 18 – 20, 2021

Regarding the NIC Technical Assistance Review (#21 J – 1007), the following questions have been developed to help assess, review, and recommend actions relative to the Technical Assistance Program

Goals: This Operational Assessment had seven objectives including the assessment of intake and release; housing units; policy and procedures; staff training; conditions of confinement and overall sanitation; security; and inmate management. It will be our intent to meet these goals and objectives in the short 3-day review, but fully recognize that in such a short visit some may not be achieved in the in-depth manner as may needed. In such event we will give our recommendations as we may determine possible.

The following areas of issue/questions address our intentions to accomplish the above:

Special Request: We have been told that the jail functions as a “Common Law Jail”. In order to adequately understand how this might operate differently than other jails, could please send us, in advance, the legal and regulatory standards under which the Oklahoma County Detention Center is required to operate. Thank you.

As to the items/questions below, please be aware that most of these will be the areas of inquiry we will be asking and addressing ourselves as we review your jail. However, at the same time, we would appreciate any verbal and/or written responses available, where appropriate, that are easily prepared and/or gathered to help us come to appropriate findings. In doing so, it is not our intent to create any excessive work for your staff even though the list looks long. Verbal responses are entirely appropriate.

Area 1 (Assess Physical Plant)

What is the condition of the physical plant? Examine the general appearance, cleanliness, sanitation, maintenance, plumbing, electrical, mechanical (A/C), security equipment, generator system, etc.;

How are issues surrounding “life safety” addressed? Examine safety and security procedures, staff training and documentation, review critical events and reports (escapes, inmate suicide, inmate death, medical emergency, tornados, winter freeze, and fire), etc.;

What is the status of the issues surrounding "conditions of confinement"? Examine food service (therapeutic meals), laundry, medical care, mental health services, access to courts, recreation, general mail process, legal mail, grievances, faith-based programming, etc.;

How would the overall sanitation be described? Examine general appearance (smell), old vs. new dirt, bathrooms cleanliness (inmate and staff), showers and hot water, food preparation areas, closets, cleaning supply controls (MSDS), etc.;

What is the status of facility and system security? Examine security systems (keys, all electronics, and surveillance), staff training, monitoring (blogs), accountability, supervision, armory, mock drills, etc.;

How is the inmate supervision provided? Examine linear, popular direct, and/or direct supervision concepts, segregation/disciplinary units, medical housing, pregnancy housing, classification system, male vs. female oversight, search rules, grievance review, inmate discipline, etc.

Area 2 (Interview Area)

How does staff describe jail operations? Examine responses to the following:

Employee/s describe/s employment history, including years of service, rank, duties, etc.? What training has the employee had and when was the last training?

What special training has been provided (describe)?

How does the staff member describe the communication techniques from supervisors, management, and administration?

How does the employee describe the policies and procedures vs. actual operations? Are there gaps and what are they?

How does the staff member describe the general relationship between staff and inmates?

Does staff feel that the personnel system is fair and equitable (such as discipline)?

Is there a reward system for good performance and how does it work?

If the employee could fix anything in the department, what might that be?

How do the inmates describe jail operations? Examine responses to the following:

How long have you been in custody?

How would you describe the relationship between officers and the inmates?

Did you receive an inmate handbook when you came in and did you review it?

Do the telephones, TVs, and other equipment you have access to work properly?
How often do you have outside recreation? Are there games available (such as cards, board games, basketballs, etc.)?

Do you have access to faith-based services and how does that work?

How does the grievance system work and is it fair?

How often do you see the medical staff and how would you describe the care?

How often is laundry exchanged?

Is there a commissary system and how would you describe it?

What is the food like?

Is there an inmate disciplinary system, and if so, how would you describe it?
Do you feel safe in your housing unit?

If you could change something in the operation, what might that be?

How do supervisors and managers describe the jail's operation? Examine responses to:

How were you prepared for your present position (education, departmental training, mandated vs. personal training, etc.)?

How effective is the communication system from jail administration?

Is there a shift briefing process and how is it used? Do you believe it works appropriately?

What is your impression of the training and preparation of the new officer for "the job"?

How does "in-service training" of staff operate?

What are the major issues you face in leading your staff in accomplishing the mission of the jail?

If you can make one positive change to the operation, what would that be?

Area 3 (Assess the Jail Operations)

How is the security of the overall operation working? Examine the actions surrounding operations related to policy and procedures relative to control rooms, inmate searches, staff searches, contraband discovery, internal and external observations, transport procedures, staff attention to duty (complacency), oversight and supervision, shift to shift communication, critical incident response and review, etc.;

What is the level of life safety preparedness and response? Examine inmate classification procedures, housing, and incident assessment to include mock drill procedures (fire, riot, suicide, death, medical emergency, staff assault, etc.), morbidity reviews, ICS operations, COOP, "Red Book", AED placements, 911 procedures, clinic tour (red bag operations), staff training (CPR, CIT, first aid, etc.), etc.;

How is the intake and release operation functioning? Examine the statistics of the function to include a number in and out, male vs. female (juvenile), medical/mental health issues, time from backdoor to housing and/or release, medical screening, technical levels and needs, security and safety of the inmate function, supervisory oversight, physical plant concerns, time to release from notice, impediments to efficiencies, citizen comments on process, etc.;

Relative to inmate supervision and behavioral management, how could the jail operation be described? Examine the staff training, inmate supervision model, and staff supervision relative to general observations to include an assessment of grievances, inmate discipline, incidents, use of force events, general inmate, and staff comments (regarding complaints, positive remarks, etc.);

What is the inmate classification system and how is it working? Examine the operational rules for classification, procedures, forms, and housing actions to include incident reviews (fights), staff concerns, validity of classification operations to system need, administrative segregation, disciplinary cells, medically compromised, gender and transgender issues, ADA (wheelchair, hearing impaired, mentally challenged, etc.) and LEP concerns, classification needs compared to housing (cell) availability, etc.;

What is the nature of inmate services and its programming? Examine the staffing complement related to this operation and conduct a listing of all services provided to include a review of the Inmate Welfare Fund (IWF) and its function, educational and drug (AA, NA efforts) services, faith-based programming, recreational reading (multiple languages), legal services, and reentry programs;

What is the level of staff training and how satisfactory is it? Examine the Academy (training hours, curriculum, state mandates, etc.), in-service training requirements, level of achievement expectations and documentation, and promotional training, leadership and executive development, state and national (NIC) attendance, conference attendance (AJA), support of personal educational achievement (CJM, FBINAA, etc.);

Area 4 (Adequacy of Policies, Procedures, and Post Orders)

Where are all the manuals, directives, orders, etc. located? Are they accessible to staff? How can their adequacy best be described? Examine the following:

General Orders and Rules;
Departmental Standard Operating Procedures;
Post Orders;
Special Manuals: Inmate Handbook
 Medical Protocols
 Therapeutic Menu Manual
 Red Book (Emergency Operations Manual)

Examine and compare all of these to the Adult Local Detention Facilities (4th Edition) Standards and/or Core Jail Standards;

Is there an understanding of the ACA Jail Accreditation Standards and the direction to achieve them?

Is the medical contractor nationally accredited by the National Commission on Correctional Health Care? Are the rules developed under JACO policies and procedures? How is this staff trained? What does the contract say?

Is there a food services vendor or is it a county operation? What does the operational manual say as the expectations and standards? How many calories do each of meals require? What about therapeutic/medical and faith-based meals (how many are there)?

Area 5 (Hot Topics/No Particular Order)

The following items are listed for review and assessment as might be deemed appropriate:

It is our understanding that the Sheriff left in July of 2020 and the Trust took over. Is there a written agreement or county outline of its expected operations? What part of the County oversees the operation of the Trust relative to the Jail (County Attorney's Office)? We will need copies of the relationship as may be available.

Is there a requirement for an Annual Grand Jury Report of the jail? When was the last one? We will need to see copies.

What is the department's budget? What are its approved vs. filled staffing levels, overtime expectations, and issues compared to other County departments?

Is there any litigation to which the department is presently subject (settlement actions, personnel decisions and/or grievances)? If so, what is the "case name" and what are the details?

What is the facility's age and what are the future plans? Is it crowded, overcrowded, 90 percent of capacity? Is it operating as designed or modified?

How is an arrestee and/or inmate oriented to the jail? Is there a video, handbook, staff presentation, etc.?

Since administrative segregation is expected to be one of the next litigation areas of concern, how does it operate in your jail? How does the jail leadership monitor the program?

Has the department been reviewing national CRIPA cases and their applicability to the jail's operation? What about inmate suicide/death cases? What about Use of Force (UOF)?

How does the operation handle "Homeland Security Concerns" or ICE "Secure Communities" programming which includes release within the 48 hours hold to release period?

How does the department address sexual predators and possible victims?

Where is the department relative to PREA and the standards that were put in place August of 2012?

How is the department addressing one of the other national concerns like use of force events? Does the department prepare reports under the "Hudson vs. McMillion" case? Is it aware of the new Kingsley vs. Hendrickson Case (6/22/2015)?

How does the jail handle pregnant inmates, hearing impaired, wheelchair-bound, etc.?

How often does the jail leadership meet with the medical team, County risk managers, County attorneys, and other surrounding jail managers?

What is the department's "strip search policy", how is it trained, who monitors it, and under what rules is it now operated (New Jersey Supreme Court Decision)?

Does the jail handle juvenile inmates and what are the rules?

Does the jail have a contagious disease plan (pandemic/covid) and how are more known diseases dealt with including MRSA, HIV, TB, etc.?

How is the department addressing the social media and staff issues?

What is the jail's relationship with the media? Is there a public information officer?

How does the mental health operation function and what are the parameters?

How does the department address the transgender inmate/staff issue?

What is the jail's morbidity review process? Does it occur within 72 hours of the event? Who attends? What happens after?

Is the department properly addressing the faith-based programming issues, religious meals, "Cutter vs. Wilkinson" case (sincerely held beliefs), RILUPA and recent changes?

Where is the jail's operation relative to technology? Does it have a JMS? How is it connected to the state, federal, other systems, etc.? Is it connected to VINE?

Does the department have a "Com – Stat" program and what is the staff expected to do with the information?

Does the County have a Criminal Justice/Public Safety Coordinating Council other than the Trust? If so, how does it work?

What contracts for services does the department use and how are they working (such as food services, commissary, medical, maintenance, transportation, etc.)?

When was the Table of Organization last reviewed? Does it meet the Mission, Vision, and Core Values of the organization?

What are the formal and informal communication links that are used? Are they effective? Why or why not?

What is the attrition rate, hiring plan, diversity accomplishments, etc.?

When was the existing staffing plan created? Last updated? What is the Relief Factor and when was it last assessed?

If I were a citizen, visiting for the first time, and picking up a relative who has been arrested for the first time, what would be my impression of the jail's operation (such as "Is it citizen friendly"?)?

Is there a future Master Plan for the jail that addresses population growth, criminal behavioral changes, etc.? When was it created and/or last reviewed?

Is there any question of the operation that should have been asked, but may have been missed?

Prepared (4/25/2021)